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10See,e.g., See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003) (“Absent contrary direction from 
Congress, we begin our interpretation of statutory language with the general presumption that a statutory term has its 
common law meaning.”); Evanv.UnitedStates,504U.S.255,259(1991)(“Itisafamiliar“maximthatastatutory
termisgeneralpresumedtohaveitscommonͲlawmeaning.”(quotingTaylorv.UnitedStates,495U.S.575,592
(1990));United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (“where a federal criminal statute uses a common law 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ofafederalstatute,seetheCourt’sdecisionsinScheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003) 
and Evansv.UnitedStates,504U.S.255,259(1991),bothdiscussedinnote10supra.
120SeeFaragherv.CityofBocaRaton,524U.S.775(1998);BurlingtonIndustries,Inc.v.Ellerth,524U.S.742
(1998).
121524U.S.at807;524U.S.at765.
12242U.S.C.§2000eetseq.
123“Anemployerissubjecttovicariousliabilitytoavictimizedemployeeforanactionablehostileenvironment
createdbyasupervisorwithimmediate(orsuccessivelyhigher)authorityovertheemployee.Whennotangible
employmentactionistaken,adefendingemployermayraiseanaffirmativedefensetoliabilityordamages,
subjecttoproofbyapreponderanceoftheevidence,seeFed.RuleCiv.Proc.8(c).Thedefensecomprisestwo
necessaryelements:(a)thattheemployerexercisedreasonablecaretopreventandcorrectpromptlyanysexually
harassingbehavior,and(b)thattheplaintiffemployeeunreasonablyfailedtotakeadvantageofanypreventiveor
correctiveopportunitiesprovidedbytheemployerortoavoidharmotherwise.Whileproofthatanemployerhad
promulgatedanantiharassmentpolicywithcomplaintprocedureisnotnecessaryineveryinstanceasamatterof
law,theneedforastatedpolicysuitabletotheemploymentcircumstancesmayappropriatelybeaddressedinany
casewhenlitigatingthefirstelementofthedefense.Andwhileproofthatanemployeefailedtofulfillthe
correspondingobligationofreasonablecaretoavoidharmisnotlimitedtoshowinganyunreasonablefailureto
useanycomplaintprocedureprovidedbytheemployer,ademonstrationofsuchfailurewillnormallysufficeto
satisfytheemployer’sburdenunderthesecondelementofthedefense.Noaffirmativedefenseisavailable,
however,whenthesupervisor’sharassmentculminatesinatangibleemploymentaction,suchasdischarge,
demotion,orundesirablereassignment.”524U.S.at807;524U.S.at765.
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statutes,124potentiallycouldhaveasignificantandsalutaryeffectonhowstatesresolvea
rangeofvicariousliabilityissuesundertheircommonlaw.Thesamepolicyargumentsthat
supportedtheCourt’sarticulationofnewdoctrineforTitleVIIcanapplytodeterminingwhen
employersshouldbeliableforthecommonlawtortsofemployeescommittedoutsidethe
scopeofemploymentbutthroughtheuseofspecialopportunitiesprovidedtothewrongͲdoing
employeebytheemployer.125
 TheCourt’stwopathͲbreakingdecisionsonemployerliabilityunderTitleVII,Burlington
Industries,Inc.v.Ellerth,126andFaragherv.CityofBocaRaton,127followedanearlierdecision,
MeritorSavingsBank,FSBv.Vinson,128whichhadstated“Congresswantedcourtstolookto
agencyprinciplesforguidanceinthisarea.”129TwelveyearslatertheCourtconsideredthat
guidanceintheEllerthandFaragheropinions.Thetwocaseswerenottreatedascompanions,
butwereinsteadarguedseparatelyandwereassignedafterargumenttotwodifferentJustices
formajorityopinions.ThereasonfortheseparateargumentandopinionswasthattheCourt
didnotgrantcertiorariinEllerthontheissueofemployerliabilityforsupervisory“hostilework
environment”harassmentlikethesexualpropositions,comments,andtouchingprovenin

124ThelowercourtsandtheEEOChaveinterpretedthedecisionstoapplytoallformsofdiscriminatory
harassmentcoveredbyTitleVII,notjustthesexualharassmentatissueinthosecases.See,e.g.,Kangv.U.Lim
America,Inc.,296F.3d810,817(9thCir.2002)(nationalorigindiscrimination);WrightͲSimmonsv.Cityof
OklahomaCity,155F.3d1264,1270(10thCir.1998)(race).SeealsoEEOCEnforcementGuidance:Vicarious
EmployerLiabilityforUnlawfulHarassmentbySupervisors(June18,1999)(EllerthandFaragherapplytoallforms
ofTitleVIIͲproscribeddiscriminatoryharassment).ThelowercourtsandtheEEOCalsohaveappliedthedecisions
toantiͲdiscriminationstatutesotherthanTitleVII.See,e.g.,Williamsv.U.S.Dept.ofLab.,Williamsv.
AdministrativeReviewBoard,376F.3d471(5thCir.2004)(whistleblowerprotectionprovisionofEnergy
ReorganizationActof1974);Whidbeev.GarzarelliFoodSpecialties,Inc.,223F.3d62,75(2dCir.2000)(§1981
racialharassmentclaim);Breedingv.ArthurJ.GallagherandCo.,164F.3d1151,1158(8thCir.1999)(Age
DiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA)claimaswellassexdiscriminationclaim);Wallinv.MinnesotaDept.of
Corrections,153F.3d681,688n.7(8thCir.1998)(AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA))(dicta);EEOC
EnforcementGuidance,supra,(holdingappliestoharassmentbasedonageunderADEAanddisabilityunderADA
aswellasTitleVIIclaims).
125SeeTANxxxͲxxxinfra.
126524U.S.742(1998).
127524U.S.777(1998).
128477U.S.57(1986).
129Id.at63.TheCourtalsostatedthat“[w]hilesuchprinciplesmaynotbetransferableinalltheirparticularsto
TitleVII,Congress’decisiontodefine“employer”toincludeany“agent”ofanemployer,42U.S.C.§2000e(b),
surelyevincesanintenttoplacesomelimitsontheactsofemployeesforwhichemployersunderTitleVIIaretobe
heldresponsible.”Id.
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Faragher;130butdidsorathertodecidewhethertheharassmentallegedinEllerth,unfulfilled
threatsbyasupervisortotakeretaliatoryactionagainstasubordinatewhodidnotrespondto
sexualovertures,131shouldbeclassifiedas“quidproquo”ratherthan“hostilework
environment”harassment.132Thatmayhaveseemedanimportantissuebecausetheper
curiamenbancSeventhCircuitCourtofAppealsdecisionappealedinEllerth133acceptedthe
liabilitydoctrinethathadbeenadoptedpostͲMeritorinmostcircuits–employersare
vicariouslyliableforquidproquoharassment,butareliableforhostileworkenvironment
harassment,includingthatofsupervisors,onlyiftheyarenegligentintheircontrolofthework
place.134
JusticeKennedy’sopinionfortheCourtinEllerth,however,recognizesthatthe
distinctionofquidproquofromhostileworkenvironmentharassmentisnotexpressedinthe
statute135and,moreimportantly,theultimaterelevanceofanypossibledistinctiondependson
therulesgoverningemployerliability:“ThequestionpresentedoncertiorariiswhetherEllerth
canstateaclaimofquidproquoharassment,buttheissueofrealconcerntothepartiesis
whetherBurlingtonhasvicariousliabilityfor[thesupervisor’s]allegedmisconduct,ratherthan
liabilitylimitedtoitsownnegligence.”136Thus,itmusthavebeenclearbothtoJusticeKennedy
andtoJusticeSouter,whowrotethemajorityopinioninFaragher,thatthesameruleson
employerliabilitymustgovernbothcases,whetherornottheserulesgeneratethesame

130ForarecountingofthetawdryfactsfoundbythecourtafterabenchtrialinFaragher,see524U.S.at780Ͳ783.
131FortheallegedfactsconsideredonamotionforsummaryjudgmentinEllerth,see524U.S.747Ͳ749.
132Theprecisequestiononwhichcertiorariwasgrantedwas:“Mayclaimofquidproquosexualharassmentbe
statedundertitleVIIwhenplaintiffemployeehasneithersubmittedtosexualadvancesofallegedharassernor
sufferedanytangibleeffectsofcompensation,terms,conditions,orprivilegesofemploymentasconsequenceof
refusaltosubmittothoseadvances?”See522U.S.1086(1998).AsstatedbytheCourtinEllerth,casesbasedon
“carriedout”threatstoretaliateif“sexualliberties’are“denied”“arereferredtooftenasquidproquocases.”524
U.S.at751.
133Jansenv.PackagingCorp.ofAmerica,123F.3d490(7thCir.1997)(enbanc).TheEllerthcasewasconsolidated
withanothercaseinvolvingunfulfilledthreatsforpurposesofenbancconsideration.
134Id.at495.
135524U.S.at752.JusticeKennedyallowedthattheCourtinMeritorhad“distinguishedbetweenquidproquo
claimsandhostileenvironmentclaims”,butasserteditdidso“toinstructthatTitleVIIisviolatedbyeitherexplicit
orconstructivealterationsinthetermsorconditionsofemploymentandtoexplainthelattermustbesevereor
pervasive.”Id.
136Id.at753.
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results.137BecauseneitherJusticeapparentlywantedtodefertotheother’sopinion,wehave
twoseparateanalysesofthegeneralcommonlawofagencyleadingtothesamereformulation
ofthatlawtogovernemployervicariousliabilityfordiscriminatoryharassmentactionable
underTitleVII.
 Theanalysisofemployerliabilityineachopinionattemptstoreachitsconclusion
throughaninterpretationofgeneralcommonlawasexpressedin§219oftheRestatement
SecondofAgency.Revealingly,neitheropiniondirectlyacknowledgesthesuggestionofJudge
Easterbrook,setforthinhisdissentfromtheCourtofAppealsdecisionreviewedin
Ellerth,138thattheagencylawofthestatewheretheharassmentoccurred,notsome
constructedgeneralcommonlaw,shouldgovern.139JusticeKennedy,quotingReid,instead
statedthattheCourtmust“rely“onthegeneralcommonlawofagency,ratherthanonthelaw
ofanyparticularState,togivemeaningtotheseterms,”140andfocusedontheRestatement
SecondofAgencyas“ausefulbeginningpointforadiscussionofgeneralagencyprinciples.”141
JusticeSouterbeganhisanalysisinhisFaragheropinionbyparsingthelanguageof§
219oftheSecondRestatementofAgency,142andconsideredtheprecedentscitingthat
languageasifhewereengagedinanendeavor,jointlywithothercourts,tofindmeaningin
thatsection’sgeneralstatementofthelaw.143JusticeSouterconsideredwhethertheprincipal,
asexpressedin§219(1),thatanemployeror“master”is“subjecttoliabilityforthetortsofhis
servantswhileactinginthescopeoftheiremployment”mightbeinterpretedfreeofthe
traditionallimitation,expressedin§228(1),thattobewithinthescopeofemployment,the

137Forafulleraccountofthebackgroundofthetwocases,includingtheoralarguments,seeMichaelC.Harper&
JoanFlynn,TheStoryofBurlingtonIndustriesv.EllerthandFaragherv.CityofBocaRaton:FederalCommon
LawmakingfortheModernAge,inEmploymentDiscriminationStories,225(J.W.Friedman,ed.)(2006).
138123F.3dat552.
139Id.at556.Inherownconcurringopinion,JudgeWoodalsoadvocatedtheuseoftheuseofstatecommonlaw
ofagency,inpartbecauseoftheconcernswithverticaluniformityunderlyingtheEriecourt’srejectionoffederal
commonlaw.Seeid.at565,571.
140524U.S.at754,quotingCommunityforCreativeNonͲViolencev.Reid,490U.S.730,740(1989).Justice
Kennedyalsowascarefultoacknowledgethat“[t]hisisnotfederalcommonlawin“thestrictestsense”…that
amounts,notsimplytoaninterpretationofafederalstatute…,but,rathertothejudicial‘creation’ofaspecial
federalruleofdecision,”quotingAthertonv.FDIC,519U.S.213,218(1997).
141Id.at755.
142RestatementSecondofAgency§219(1)(1957).
143See524U.S.at793Ͳ796.
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tortmustbe“actuated,atleastinpart,byapurposetoservethemaster.”144Thiswas
significantbecauseinFaraghertheapparentsupervisors’pervasivesexualpropositions,
posturing,andtouchingclearlywerenot“actuated”toservetheCityofBocaRaton.145Justice
Souter’sconsiderationincludedacitationofnumerousdecisionsfromvariousjurisdictions
applyingcommonlawtotreatwithinthescopeofemploymentreasonablyforeseeableactivity
relatedtoemploymentdutiesevenwhennotmotivatedtoservetheemployer.146Thoughhe
ultimatelydeclinedtoresthisanalysisonabroadinterpretationof“scopeofemployment,”in
partbecausedoingsowouldalsocreatevicariousemployerliabilityforcoͲworker
harassment,147JusticeSoutersuggestedthatthesecommonlawcasesmightjustifymaking
nonͲnegligentemployersliableforactionablediscriminatoryharassment“asoneofthecostsof
doingbusiness,tobechargedtotheenterpriseratherthanthevictim.”148
 JusticeKennedyinhisEllerthopinionalsoconsidered§219(1)andacknowledged
“instances...whereasupervisorengagesinunlawfuldiscriminationwiththepurpose,mistaken
orotherwise,toservetheemployer;”149andherecognizedthatthe“conceptofscopeof
employmenthasnotalwaysbeenconstruedtorequireamotivetoservetheemployer.”150
Nonetheless,JusticeKennedyquicklydismissedtheconceptasabasisforaTitleVIIliability
rule151infavorofanattempttoformulateanewrulebasedon§219(2)(d).152Thislatter
sectionprovidesforemployervicariousliabilitywherethe“employeepurportedtoactorto
speakonbehalfoftheprincipalandtherewasrelianceuponapparentauthority,orhewas

144RestatementSecondofAgency§228(1)(1957)See524U.S.at793.
145ThesupervisorswhoharassedFaraghercouldnothavethoughtthatanyoftheirharassment,see524U.S.at
780Ͳ783,advancedtheinterestsoftheCityofBocaRaton.
146Id.at794Ͳ795.ThesecasesincludedJudgeFriendly’softencited,butquestionable,decisioninIraS.Bushey&
Sons,Inc.v.UnitedStates,398F.2d167(2dCir.1968),findingthegovernmentvicariouslyliableforthedamage
causedbyadrunkensailor’sfloodingofadrydockbyopeningvalvesfornopossibleconstructivepurpose.
147Id.at799.JusticeSouterstressedthatthelowercourtshad“uniformly”judged“employerliabilityforcoͲworker
harassmentunderanegligencestandard.”Id.JusticeSouteralsoallowed“thereisnoreasontosupposethat
Congresswishedcourtstoignorethetraditionaldistinctionbetweenactsfallingwithinthescopeandacts
amountingtowhattheolderlawcalledfrolicsordetoursfromthecourseofemployment.“Id.at798.
148Id.
149524U.S.at757.
150Id.
151“Thegeneralruleisthatsexualharassmentbyasupervisorisnotconductwithinthescopeofemployment.”Id.
152Id.at758Ͳ759.
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aidedinaccomplishingthetortbytheexistenceoftheagencyrelation.”153JusticeKennedy
interpretedthephraseafterthecommatostandindependentofthephrasebefore“and,”so
thatthephrasecouldapplytotheuseofan“agencyrelation”intheabsenceofasupervisor
purportingtoactonbehalfofanemployer.154Hethenlimitedthisbroadinterpretationby
assertingitrequiressomethingmorethananemploymentrelationshipthataffordsthe
“[p]roximityandregularcontact”ofacoͲworker.155JusticeKennedyfurtherpressedhis
interpretationofthelastphrasein§219(2)(d)byasserting,withoutanydirectprecedential
support,thatthephraseisthebasisforfindingemployersliable–presumablynotonlyunder
TitleVII,butalsounderotherlawͲͲforsupervisorstakingwhathecalled“tangible”
employmentactions,suchasadischargeordenialofaraiseorapromotion,against
subordinates.156JusticeKennedyofferedtwo,notfullyconsistent,waysofdefining“tangible,”
onerestingonwhetheritentailsa“significantchangeinemploymentstatus”157andtheother
requiring“anofficialactoftheenterprise,acompanyact,”which“inmostcasesisdocumented
inofficialcompanyrecords,andmaybesubjecttoreviewbyhigherlevelsupervisors.”158

153RestatementSecondofAgency§219(2)(d)(1957).
154524U.S.at759Ͳ760.Thismayhavemisconstruedwhat§219(2)(d)wasintendedtomean.Theinterpretation
rendersthescopeofemploymentlimitationlargelynugatory,oratleastsuperfluous,becausealmostalltorts
resultingfromtheemploymentrelationshipare“aided”bytheexistenceofthatrelationship,regardlessofthe
tortfeasor’sindependentcourseofconductandmotivationforcommittingthetorts.TheIllustrationsincomment
e.to§219clarifythatthe“aided...bytheexistenceoftheagencyrelationship”clause,liketheapparent
authorityclause,wasmeanttoqualify“purportedtoactortospeakonbehalfoftheprincipal.”ThoseIllustrations
indicatethatthetortfeasingemployeemustclaimtobespeakingoractingwithauthoritydelegatedfromsome
principal.Incommenta.to§228oftheRestatementSecondofAgency,theplacementofthecommaafter
“principal”makesthisintentmoreclear:“amastermaybeliableifaservantspeaksoracts,purportingtodosoon
behalfofhisprincipal,andthereisrelianceuponhisapparentauthorityorheisaidedinaccomplishingthetortby
theexistenceoftheagencyrelation.”SeePaulaJ.Dailey,AllinaDay’sWork:Employers’VicariousLiabilityfor
SexualHarassment,104W.Va.L.Rev.517,550(2002).
155524U.S.at760.
156Id.Thisnewinterpretationofthe“aidedintheagencyrelation”phrasewasunnecessarytoexplainwhy
employersarealwaysliableforformalemploymentdecisions,suchasdischargesanddemotions,madebyagents
withdelegatedauthoritytomakethosedecisionsinbehalfoftheemployer.Mostemployersinthemodern
economyarelegalentities,suchascorporations,thatactonlythroughhumanagentswithdelegatedauthorityto
actfortheentity.Asreiteratedin§7.04oftheRestatementThirdofAgency,thecommonlawhasprovidedthata
“principalissubjecttoliabilitytoathirdpartyharmedbyanagent’s[tortious]conductwhentheagent’sconductis
withinthescopeoftheagent’sactualauthority.”Cf.notexxxinfra.Furthermore,mostdiscriminatoryor
retaliatoryformalemploymentdecisionsalsoaremadewithinthescopeofthedecisionmaker’semploymentin
parttoservetheemployer.
157524U.S.at761.
158Id.at762.TheCourteffectivelyadoptedtheseconddefinitioninitslateropinioninPennsylvaniaStatePolicev.
Suders,542U.S.129(2004).InSuders,theCourtheldthattheFaragherͲEllerthaffirmativedefenseisavailablein
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JusticeKennedy,however,wasnotabletoexplainhowthe“aidedintheagencyrelation
standard”derivedfromthegeneralcommonlawexpressedin§219(2)(d)coulddetermine
whetherthereshouldbeemployerliabilityincasesthatdonotincludetangibleemployment
actions.159
 Aftersettingasideabroadinterpretationofthescopeofemploymentstandardinhis
Faragheropinion,JusticeSouteragreedwithJusticeKennedy’streatmentofthelastphrasein§
219(2)(d)asanindependentstandardthat“providesanappropriatestartingpointfor
determiningliability”fordiscriminatoryharassment.160JusticeSouter,however,alsodidnot
findthestandardtobesatisfactorystandingalonetodetermineemployerliabilityunderTitle
VIIforasupervisor’smisuseofauthority.JusticeSouterassertedthatwhileaharassing
supervisormayalwaysbeassistedinhismisconducttosomedegreebyhisauthorityover
subordinates,161imposingvicariousliabilityforallactionablesupervisoryharassmentwouldbe
inconsistentwithlanguageinMeritorstatingtheCourtofAppealsinthatcasehad“erredin
concludingthattheemployersarealwaysautomaticallyliableforharassmentbytheir
supervisors.”162
 BothJusticesthusfeltitnecessarytoframeastandardforliabilitythattookinto
accountnotonlywhattheycouldderivefromthegeneralcommonlawofagencyasexpressed

caseswhereasupervisor’sharassmentdoesnotincludeanofficialactandisnotsignificantorsevereenoughto
satisfythehighstandardforconstructivedischarge,ashowingofworkingconditionssointolerabletowarranta
reasonableemployee’sresignation.QuotingfromEllerth,theSudersCourtstressedthatwhetheradecisionis
tangibleturnsnotonseverity,butratheronwhetheritis“anofficialactoftheenterprise,acompanyact.”
“[T]angibleemploymentactions“fallwithinthespecialprovinceofthesupervisor,”who“hasbeenempoweredby
thecompanyas…[an]agenttomakeeconomicdecisionsaffectingotheremployeesunderhisorhercontrol.””Id.
at144Ͳ145,quotingEllerth,524U.S.at762.Thisdefinitionencompassespreciselythoseactsoftheagentthatare
withintheagent’sscopeofauthority.Seenotexxxsupra.
159InVancev.BallStateUniversity,570U.S.XXX(2013)(slipopat18),theCourtnonethelesscitedtheEllerth
decision’sdistinctionof“tangible”employmentactionsasabasisforlimitingthereachofthenewvicarious
liabilityitformulatedinEllerthandFaragher.Seenotexxxinfra.
160524U.S.at802.
161Id.at803Ͳ04.
162477U.S.at72,quotedinFaragher,524U.S.at804.JusticeKennedy,likeJusticeSouter,alsotreatedthis
statementasaholdingofMeritor,bindingontheCourtasstaredecisis.524U.S.at763Ͳ764.Forthecontraryview
thattheMeritordecisiondidnotbindtheCourtfromannouncingaruleofstrictemployerliabilityforall
supervisoryharassment,seeMichaelC.Harper&JoanFlynn,TheStoryofBurlingtonIndustriesv.Ellerthand
Faragherv.CityofBocaRaton:FederalCommonLawmakingfortheModernAge,inEmploymentDiscrimination
Stories,225,254Ͳ256(J.W.Friedman,ed.)(2006).
FederalGeneralCommonLawofEmployment

37

intheRestatementSecondofAgency,butalsoTitleVII’s“basicpoliciesofencouraging
forethoughtbyemployersandsavingactionbyobjectingemployees.”163The“primary
objective”ofTitleVII,JusticeSouterasserted,“likethatofanystatutemeanttoinfluence
primaryconduct,isnottoprovideredressbuttoavoidharm.”164Suchavoidance,inJustice
Souter’sview,couldbeencouragedbytemperingthe§219(2)(d)standardwithanaffirmative
defenseforemployerswhocouldestablishboththeirownreasonableeffortstoavoid
discriminatoryharassmentofthesortsufferedbyanaggrievedemployeeandtheemployee’s
failuretomakereasonableeffortstoavoidthatharassment.165JusticeKennedyagreedthat
Congress’intention“toencouragethecreationofantiharassmentpoliciesandeffective
grievancemechanisms”andTitleVII’sdeterrencegoalssupportedformulationofatwoͲ
prongedaffirmativedefense.166Eachopiniontherebycouldagreewiththesameformulation
ofdoctrine:
“Anemployerissubjecttovicariousliabilitytoavictimizedemployeeforanactionable
hostileenvironmentcreatedbyasupervisorwithimmediate(orsuccessivelyhigher)
authorityovertheemployee.Whennotangibleemploymentactionistaken,a
defendingemployermayraiseanaffirmativedefensetoliabilityordamages,….The
defensecomprisestwonecessaryelements:(a)thattheemployerexercisedreasonable
caretopreventandcorrectpromptlyanysexuallyharassingbehavior,and(b)thatthe
plaintiffemployeeunreasonablyfailedtotakeadvantageofanypreventiveorcorrective
opportunitiesprovidedbytheemployerortoavoidharmotherwise.…Noaffirmative
defenseisavailable,however,whenthesupervisor’sharassmentculminatesina
tangibleemploymentaction,suchasdischarge,demotion,orundesirable
reassignment.”167


163524U.S.at807;524U.S.at765.
164524U.S.at806.
165Id.
166524U.S.at764.
167524U.S.at807;524U.S.at765.Forafullerstatementofthejoint“holding”ofthecases,seenotexxxsupra.
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 Thefactthatthiselaboratedoctrine,unlikethefederalcommonlawpronouncedbythe
CourtinReidandClackamas,wasacknowledgedtobeonlyunderthe“guidance”168ofthe
generalcommonlawandultimatelybasedonstatutorypolicy,doesnotrenderthedoctrineof
lesspotentialrelevancetoageneralcommonlawmakingprocessinvolvingstateaswellas
federalcourts.TheCourt’sformulationofthisdoctrinewasasmuchaninstanceofjudiciallaw
makingastheformulationofanydoctrineunderafederalcommonlawmakingauthoritybased
onbroadjurisdictionalgrantslikethatof§301oftheLaborManagementRelationsAct169oron
anopenͲendedsubstantivelawlikethatoftheShermanAct.170Indeed,theCourt’screative
formulationofanewaffirmativedefensetostrictvicariousliabilitywasasmuchaninstanceof
lawmakingasthepromulgationofafederallegislativeregulationthroughtheformal
rulemakingprocessesrequiredby§553oftheAdministrativeProcedureAct.171TheCourtcould
notanddidnotpretenditwassimplyinterpretingwhatCongresshadintendedbystatutory
languageinTitleVIIthatofferednomoreguidancethanadefinitionofemployertoinclude
“anyagent.”172
 Furthermore,thenewfederalcommonlawofFaragherandEllerthhasthesame
potentiallyinfluentialbutnotcontrollingrelationtostatelawasdidthegeneralcommonlaw
thatwaspronouncedundertheregimeofSwiftv.Tyson.FederalantiͲdiscrimination
employmentlawassumesratherthanpreemptstheexistenceofvariantstateantiͲ
discriminationlaw;173federallawallowsthestatelawtovaryaslongasitdoesnotdirectly
conflictwithfederallawbyrequiringthatwhichthefederallawprohibits.174StateantiͲ

168SeeMeritor,477U.S.at63,supranoteandTANxxx.
169LaborManagementRelationsActof1947,§301,codifiedat29U.S.C.§185(2000).See,e.g.,TextileWorkers
Unionv.LincolnMillsofAlabama,353448(1957)(interpretingjurisdictionalgrantoversuitsforviolationof
contractsbetweenanemployerandalabororganizationtoconferauthoritytocreatelawgoverningsuchsuits).
170See15U.S.C.§§1and2.
1715U.S.C.§553.
172“Theterm“employer”meansapersonengagedinanindustryaffectingcommercewhohasfifteenormore
employeesforeachworkingdayineachoftwentyormorecalendarweeksinthecurrentorpreceedingcalendar
year,andanyagentofsuchaperson....”42U.S.C.§2000e(b).
173TheassumptionofparallelstateregulationofemploymentdiscriminationismanifestinTitleVII’sprocedural
system,whichrequiresfirstfilingdiscriminationchargeswithanystateorlocalauthoritythathasalawcovering
theallegeddiscrimination.See42U.S.C.§2000eͲ5(c).
174SeeCaliforniaFederalSavingsandLoanAssn.v.Guerra,479U.S.272(1987).AstheCourtinGuerrastressed,id.
at281Ͳ92,§708ofTitleVIIprovidesforthepreemptionofstatelaws“onlyiftheyactuallyconflictwithfederal
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discriminationinemploymentlawthusmayimposeeithergreaterorlesserliabilityon
employersfordiscriminatorysupervisoryharassmentthanthatimposedunderFaragherand
Ellerth.Stateantidiscriminationlaw,however,oftentracksfederallaw,withstatecourts
lookingtoSupremeCourtconstructionsoffederallawforguidance.Thus,numerousstate
courtshaveadoptedtheFaragherͲEllerthdoctrineforstateantiͲdiscriminationlawstatutes.175
 TheinfluenceofFaragherandEllerthmayderivefromacompellingpolicyrationalefor
qualifiedstrictliabilitythatwasnotfullydevelopedbyeitherJusticeSouterorJusticeKennedy.
TheFaragherͲEllerthaffirmativedefenseͲqualifiedemployerliabilityfordiscriminatory
supervisoryharassmentencouragesthereductionofsuchharassmentbyimposingthecostsof
theharassmentonthatpartythatpresumablywasinthebestpositiontoavoidtheharassment
atthelowestcosts.176DoingsoprovidestothatpartytheincentivetoweightheriskͲ
discountedcostsoftakingparticularavoidancemeasuresagainsttheriskͲdiscountedbenefits
ofthosemeasures.TheFaragherͲEllerthdoctrinereasonablyassumesthatinmostcasesthe
costsofavoidancearegreaterforanemployeeͲvictimofhersupervisor’sharassmentthanfor
anemployerwithauthorityoverthatsupervisor.ThetwoͲprongedaffirmativedefensethat

law”bypurporting“torequireorpermitthedoingofanyactwhichwouldbeanunlawfulemploymentpractice
under”TitleVII.42U.S.C.§2000eͲ7.
175See,e.g.,Frielerv.CarlsonMarketingGroup,751N.W.2D558,563(Minn.S.Ct.2008)(MinnesotaantiͲ
discriminationlaw);Ocanav.AmericanFurnitureCo.,135N.M.539,551,91P.23d58,70(2004)(NewMexicoantiͲ
discriminationlaw);BankOne,Kentuckyv.Murphy,52S.W.3d540,544(Ky.2001)(KentuckyantiͲdiscrimination
law);Brentlingerv.HighlightsforChildren,142OhioApp.3d25,32(2001)(OhioantiͲdiscriminationlaw);Parkerv.
WarrenCountyUtilityDistrict,2S.W.3d170,174(Tenn.1999)(TennesseeantiͲdiscriminationlaw);seealso
FarmlandFoods,Inc.v.DubuqueHumanRightsComm’n,672N.W.2d733,744(S.Ct.Iowa2003)(dicta;Iowacity
ordinance);Boudreauxv.LouisianaCasinoCruises,Inc.,762So.2d1200,1205(La.App.2000)(Louisiana’s
repealedantiͲdiscriminationlaw);StateDept.ofHealthServicesv.SuperiorCourtofSacramentoCounty,79P.3d
556(Cal.2003)(adoptingvariationonFaragher/EllerthasavoidableconsequencesdoctrineunderCaliforniaFair
EmploymentandHousingAct).ButseeZakrzewskav.NewSchool,14N.Y.3d469,479Ͳ480,928N.E.2d1035,1039,
902N.Y.S.2D838,842(Ct.ofApp.N.Y.2010)(Fargaher/Ellerthaffirmativedefensenotavailableunder
AdministrativeCodeofCityofNewYorkbecausestatutorylanguagecoversallexercisesof“managerialor
supervisoryresponsibility”);Pollockv.WetterauFoodDistributionGroup,11S.W.3d754,767(Mo.Ct.ofApp.
1999)(applyingregulationtomakeemployerstrictlyliableforsupervisoryharassmentunderMissourilaw);Myrick
v.GTEMainStreetInc.,73F.Supp.2d94,98(D.Mass.1999)(relyingonCollegeͲTownv.Massachusetts
CommissionAgainstDiscrimination,400Mass.156(1987))(underMassachusettsantiͲdiscriminationlawemployer
isstrictlyliableforsupervisoryharassmentwithoutFaragher/Ellerthaffirmativedefense);Chambersv.Trettco,
Inc.,463Mich.297,307,614N.W.2d910,914(Mich.2000)(decliningtoadoptFaragher/EllerthforMichiganantiͲ
discriminationlaw;plaintiffmustprovetheemployerfailedtotakepromptandadequateremedialaction).
176Thisrationaleforstrictliabilitywheregeneraldeterrenceistheprimarygoalofpolicyderivesfromtheworkof
JudgeCalabresi.SeeGuidoCalabresi,TheCostsofAccidents(1970),esp.chs.7and10;GuidoCalabresi&JonT.
Hirschoff,TowardaTestforStrictLiabilityinTorts,81YaleL.J.1055(1972).
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qualifiesanemployer’sstrictliabilityundertheFaragherͲEllerthdoctrine,however,recognizes
thatthisassumptioncannotbemadewhenitcanbeshownboththattheemployertook
reasonableavoidancestepsandalsothattheemployeedidnot.177Thispolicyrationalealso
helpsexplainstheCourt’sacceptanceofamoreforgivingnegligencestandardtogovern
employerliabilitytoanemployeewhosuffersdiscriminatoryharassmentfromcoͲworkers
withoutdelegatedauthoritytoaffectherworklife;178itisnotaslikelythatanemployeeͲvictim
wouldincurgreatercoststhanheremployerinavoidingorpreventingharassmentbycoͲ
workerswhomshecanavoidorreportonwithoutfearofreprisal.179

177Forafullerdevelopmentofthisrationale,seeMichaelC.Harper,EmployerLiabilityforHarassmentUnderTitle
VII:AFunctionalRationaleforFaragherandEllerth,6SanDiegoL.Rev.101(1999).SeealsoJ.HoultVerkerke,
NoticeLiabilityinEmploymentDiscriminationLaw,81Va.L.Rev.272(1995).
178AlthoughthefirstprongoftheFaragherͲEllerthaffirmativedefensearticulatesareasonablecarestandardfor
employerstopreventandcorrectharassmentthatseemssimilartothatsetbyanegligentstandard,see29C.F.R.
§1604.11(d)(employerisnegligentifitkneworshouldhaveknownofharassmentandfailedtotakecorrective
action),anegligencestandardforemployerliabilityismoreforgivingforseveralreasons.First,theFaragherͲEllerth
affirmativedefenseincludesasecondprongthatconditionstheavoidanceofemployerliabilityforasupervisor’s
harassmentontheemployeenottakingreasonableavoidancesteps,aswellasontheemployermeetinga
reasonablecasestandard.Therefore,incaseswheretheemployerdidnotandcouldnotknowoftheharassment,
itcouldstillbeliableiftheemployeeherselfwasnotnegligent.Second,theFaragherͲEllerthdoctrineprovidesan
affirmativedefensethatreversestheburdenofproofontoemployers.And,third,anegligenceapproach
presumablyrequiresproofofcausation,whilecausationdoesnotseemtobeanelementoftheaffirmative
defense.Indeed,JusticeThomas’sdissentinFaragher,whichassumedthatanegligencestandardshouldbe
appliedfortheharassmentinthatcase,wasbasedinpartonthemajority’sfailuretoconsiderwhetherany
deficienciesinBocaRaton’santiͲharassmentpolicyandpracticeledtoitslackofknowledgeofFaragherbeing
harassed.See524U.S.at810Ͳ811.
179ButseeHarper,supranotexxx,at82Ͳ86.
Therationale,however,doesnotsupporttheCourt’scloselydivided(5Ͳ4)decisioninVancev.BallState
University,570U.S.xxx(2013).Thatdecisionlimitsanemployer’squalifiedstrictvicariousliabilitytoharassment
bysupervisorswhom“theemployerhasempoweredtotaketangibleemploymentactionsagainstthevictim,”i.e.,
toeffecta“significantchangeinemploymentstatus,suchashiring,firing,failingtopromote,reassignmentwith
significantlydifferentresponsibilities,oradecisioncausingasignificantchangeinbenefits.””Slipop.at9(quoting
Ellerth,524U.S.at761.)TheVanceCourtrejectedthebroaderreachoftheFaragherͲEllerthdoctrineadvocatedby
theEEOC’sEnforcementGuidance,whichties“supervisorstatustotheabilitytoexercisesignificantdirectionover
another’sdailywork.”Id.,citingEEOC,EnforcementGuidance:VicariousEmployerLiabilityforUnlawful
HarassmentbySupervisors(1999).WhetherornottheVancemajoritywascorrectinclaimingthatitslimitation
providedamuchclearerlineforjudgesandjuriestoapplythandidtheEEOCstandard,seeslipopat21Ͳ24,Justice
Ginsburg’sdissentinsupportoftheEEOCapproachexpressedabetterunderstandingofwhysupervisorsshould
bedistinguishedfromcoͲworkersforpurposesofrulesdefiningemployerliability:
“Exposedtoafellowemployee’sharassment,onecanwalkawayortelltheoffenderto“buzzoff.”A
supervisor’sslingsandarrows,however,arenotsoeasilyavoided.Anemployeewhoconfrontsher
harassingsupervisorrisks,forexample,receivinganundesirableorunsafeworkassignmentoran
unwantedtransfer.Shemaybesaddledwithanexcessiveworkloadorwithplacementonashiftspanning
hoursdisruptiveofherfamilylife.…Asupervisorwithauthoritytocontrolsubordinates’dailyworkisno
lessaidedinhisharassmentthanisasupervisorwithauthoritytofire,demote,ortransfer.”
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 ThesamepolicyrationaleindicateswhytheFaragherͲEllerthdoctrinecouldinfluence
thedevelopmentofstatecommonlawjustasithasinfluencedtheconstructionofstateantiͲ
discriminationlaw.Insomecases,asupervisor’sharassmentofsubordinateemployeesmay
constituteanactionablecommonlawtort180thatwouldexposetheharassingsupervisorto
liability.181Employerliabilityinsuchcases,however,posesthesamedoctrinalchallengeasthat
confrontedbytheCourtinFaragherandEllerth.Manystatecourts,especiallybeforetheCivil
RightsActof1991firstauthorizedthegrantofcompensatorydamagesunderTitleVII,182held
employersliablefortortioussexualharassmentunderatheoryofdirectliabilityfornegligent
supervision,akintothenegligencestandardforemployerliabilityforcoͲworkerharassment
actionableunderTitleVII.183Thistheoryprovidesabasisfordirectemployerliabilityfor
harassmentthatisnotwithinthescopeofemploymentandthussubjecttovicariousliability,
andwhichalsomaynotbesubjecttotheexclusiveremedyprovidedinworkers’compensation
lawsforinjuriesarisingoutofaswellaswithinthecourseofemployment.184Thetheory,

Ginsburg,J.dissenting(slipop.at4,8).
180See,e.g.,Pattersonv.AugatWiringsystems,Inc.,944F.Supp.1509(M.D.Ala.1996)(recognizingharassment
mayconstitutetortsofassault,battery,outrage,orpossiblyinvasionofprivacyunderAlabamalaw);GTE
Southwest,Inc.v.Bruce,998S.W.2d605(Tex.1999)(recognizingharassmentmayconstitutetortofintentional
inflictionofemotionaldistressunderTexaslaw);Davisv.UtahPower&LightCo.,53FEPCas.1039(D.Utah1988)
(recognizingharassmentmayconstitutetortsofintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress,assault,andbattery
underUtahlaw).
181Thelowercourtshaveinterpretedtheword“agent”inthedefinitionofemployerinTitleVII,see42U.S.C.§
2000e(b),toincorporateagencyliabilityprinciples,butnottorenderagentssubjecttodirectliability.See,e.g.,
Wathenv.GeneralElec.Co.,115F.3d400(6thCir.1997);Williamsv.Banning,72F.3d552(7thCir.1995).
182See42U.S.C.§1981A.PriortotheCivilRightsActof1991,TitleVIIonlyauthorizedequitablerelief.See42
U.S.C.§2000eͲ1(g)(1),includingbackpayandreinstatement.Suchequitablereliefwouldnotbemeaningfultoa
victimofsexualharassmentwhosufferedabusiveworkingconditions,butnotanadverse“tangible”employment
decision,suchasadischarge,demotion,orpaycut,atleastunlesstheworkingconditionsweresufficientlysevere
toconstituteconstructivedischarge.SeeMeritorSavingsBankv.Vinson,477U.S.57,xxx,xxx(1986)(Marshall,J.
concurring).Providingameaningfulremedyfordiscriminatoryabusiveworkingconditionsindeedwasoneofthe
primaryimpetusesforthe1991Act.SeeMichaelC.Harper,EliminatingtheNeedforCapsonTitleVIIDamage
Awards:TheShieldofKolstadv.AmericanDentalAssociation,14N.Y.U.J.ofLeg.&Pub.Pol.477,481Ͳ483(2011).
183See,e.g.,Pattersonv.AugatWiringSystems,Inc.944F.Supp.1509(N.D.Ala.1996)(applyingAlabamalaw);
Bakerv.WeyerhaeuserCo.,903F.2d1342,1348(10thCir1990)(applyingOklahomalaw;juryfoundemployer
knewofsexualharassment,butdidnotacttostopit);Keransv.PorterPaintCo.,61OhioSt.3d486,493,575
N.E.2d428,431(1991)(employer“maybeindependentlyliableforfailingtotakecorrectiveactionagainstan
employeewhoposesathreatofharmtofellowemployees”);Coxv.Brazo,165Ga.App.888,889,303S.E.2d71,
73(1983)(same).
184EveryjurisdictionintheUnitedStateshasaworkers’compensationsystemthatprovidescompensationwithout
regardtofaultforatleastphysicalinjuriesarisingoutofandinthecourseofemployment.Inalljurisdictionsthis
compensationprovidesaremedythatprecludesotherrecoveryforthesameinjuries.See6LexK.Larson,Larson’s
Workers’CompensationLaw1100.01(MatthewBendered.2011).Thetortofnegligentsupervision,however,
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however,requiresproofofanemployer’smanagerialnegligence,evenincaseslikeFaragher
andEllerthwheretheharassmentisinflictedonsubordinateemployees.Inordertoexpand
employerliabilityfromadirectͲnegligencetoavicariousͲstrictstandard,185courtshadto
expandtheconceptof“scopeofemployment”186orof“aidedbyagencyrelationship”187
beyondthatadoptedbyeithertheSecondorThirdRestatementofAgencyorbytheCourtin
FaragherorEllerth.188
 TheFaragherͲEllerthdoctrinenowoffersstatecourtsacompromiseofqualified
vicariousliabilitywithasstrongarationalefortortliabilityasforliabilityunderstatutory
antidiscriminationlaw.Theissueofemployerliabilityforitssupervisors’actionabletortson
employersremainsimportantevenaftertheCivilRightsActof1991’sauthorizationof

maysubjectevenemployersotherwisecoveredbyworkers’compensationtodirectliabilityforthementalor
emotionaldistresscausedbyharassmentoutsidethescopeofemployment.See,e.g.,Siscov.Fabrication
Technologies,Inc.,350F.Supp.2d932,943(D.Wyo.2004);Gerberv.Vincent’sMen’sHairstyling,Inc.,57So.3d
935,937(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011);Gasperv.RuffinHotelCorp.ofMaryland,183Md.App.211,230,960A.2d
1228,1239(Md.Ct.Spec.App.2008);Pattersonv.AugatWiringSystems,Inc.,supranotexxx;Keransv.Porter
PaintCo.,supranotexxx;Hoganv.ForsythCountryClub,79N.C.App.483,495,340S.E.2d116,124(1986).But
seePetersonv.ArlingtonHospitalityStaffing,Inc.,276Wis.2d746,752,689N.W.2d61,64(2004);Kostantopoulos
v.WestvacoCorp.,690A.2d936,937(Del.1996);Fieldsv.CumminsEmployeesFed.CreditUnion,540N.E.2d631,
640(Ind.Ct.App.1989)(allfindingpreclusionofclaimsfornegligentsupervisionofharassment).
185Foranexplanationofwhythisisanexpansionofemployerliability,seenotexxxsupra.
186See,e.g.,StateofArizonav.Schallock,189Ariz.250,260,941P.2d1275,1285(1997)(sexualassaultsby
supervisoratworkplace,eventhoughnottoservetheemployer,were“foreseeable”becauseofemployer’s
knowledgeandthuswithinscopeofemployment).SeealsoTANxxxͲxxxandnotexxxsupra.
187See,e.g.,Sparksv.PilotFreightCarriers,Inc.,830F.2d1554,1559(11thCir.1987)(TitleVIIliability);Rauhv.
Coyne,744F.Supp.1186,1191(D.D.C.1990)(employercouldbeliableforsexualassaultbyasupervisorymanager
becauseassaultwasaidedbytheagencyrelationship).Fordiscussionofwhythistreatmentof“aidedbythe
agencyrelationship”isexpansive,seeTANxxͲxxandnotesxxandxxsupra.
188SomecourtsalsofoundemployersdirectlyliableforharassmentͲbasedtortsthroughexpansionoftheagency
lawconceptofexpostauthorizationor“ratification.”See,e.g.,Jonesv.B.L.Dev.Corp.,940So.2d961,966(Miss.
Ct.App.2006)(doingnothingtoreprimandaknownemployeeͲwrongdoerisratification);Mardisv.RobbinsTire&
RubberCo.,669So.2d885,889Ͳ890(Ala.1995)(ratificationdoctrineobviatesneedtoproveemployer’snegligence
causedinjury);Simonv.MorehouseSchoolofMedicine,908F.Supp.959,973(N.D.Ga.1995)(negligent
supervisionconstitutesratificationunderGeorgialaw).Thesedecisionsequatedanemployer’sfailuretocontrol
knownharassmentwithratificationofthatharassment,ignoringthetraditionalcommonlawrequirementthatthe
agentmusthave“actedorpurportedtoactasanagent”oftheratifyingprincipal.SeeRestatementThirdof
Agency§4.03(“Apersonmayratifyanactiftheactoractedorpurportedtoactasanagentontheperson’s
behalf.”).Seealso,e.g.,Fretlandv.CountyofHumboldt,63Cal.App.4th897,905,74Cal.Rptr.379,384(1998)
(“Ratificationisthevoluntaryelectionbyapersontoadoptinsomemannerashisownanactwhichwas
purportedlydoneonhisbehalfbyanotherperson,theeffectofwhich,astosomeoneorallpersons,istotreatthe
actasiforiginallyauthorizedbyhim.”)Harassersofcoursedonottypicallypurporttobeactingonbehalfoftheir
employers,evenwhentheyusetheirdelegatedpowertocontroltheirvictims.
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compensatorydamages,notonlybecausethosedamagesarelimitedbycaps,189butalso
becausesomeofthoseactionabletortsmaynotbediscriminatoryandthusactionableunderan
antidiscriminationstatute.190Forinstance,asupervisor’sharassmentorbullyingofsubordinate
employeesmaybesufficiently“extremeandoutrageous”toconstitutethetortofintentional
inflictionofemotionaldistressunderastate’ssubstantivetortlaw,191regardlessofwhetherthe
bullyingisinanymannerdiscriminatory.192Ifthebullyingisnotremedialthroughanexclusive
workers’compensationremedy,eitherbecauseitwasnotwithinthescopeofemployment193
orbecausetheresultantseveredistressdidnotderiveprimarilyfromaphysicalinjury,194the
issueofemployerliabilitymustberesolved.Theargumentforresolutionofthatissuethrough
theaffirmativedefenseͲqualifiedvicariousliabilitydelineatedinFaragherandEllerthisas
strongasitwasforTitleVIIliabilityforthediscriminatoryharassmentinthosecases.
Furthermore,thestate’ssubstantivetortlawpresumablyhasasstrongadeterrentpolicyasthe
TitleVIIpolicyonwhichJusticesSouterandKennedypurportedtoresttheirnewdoctrineof
qualifiedvicariousliability.195
 ThepotentialinfluenceonstatecommonlawoftheCourt’snewqualifiedvicarious
liabilitydoctrine,moreover,mayextendwellbeyondcasesbroughtbysubordinateemployees.
Thedoctrinealsoiswellsuitedtodefineemployerliabilityfortortsinflictedbyemployees
outsidethescopeofemployment,inpartbecauseoftheemployer’ssignificantaugmentation

18942U.S.C.§1981A(b)(3)(limitingthesumofcompensatoryandpunitivedamagestoasumrangingfrom$50,000
to$300,00,dependingonthesizeoftheemployer).
190HarassmentofcourseisonlyactionableunderTitleVIIifitisdiscriminatory.SeeOncaLev.SundownerOffshore
Services,Inc.,523U.S.75,80Ͳ81(1998).
191See,e.g.,GTESouthwest,Inc.v.Bruce,998S.W.2d605,42Tex.Sup.Ct.J.907(1999)(supervisorintentionally
inflictssevereemotionaldistressbyregularlycursingandthreateningsubordinateswithviolence).
192Courts,ontheotherhand,havefoundsexualharassmenttobesevereorpervasiveenoughtobeactionable
underTitleVIInotsufficientlyextremeandoutrageoustoconstitutetheintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress.
See,e.g.,Minerv.MidͲAmDoorCo.,68P.3d212,223(Okla.Civ.App.2002);Hoyv.Angleone,554Pa.134,152,
720A.2d745,754(1998).
193See,e.g.,Horodyskyjv.Karanian,32P.3d470,474(Colo.2001)(“intheusualcase,injuriesresultingfrom
workplacesexualharassmentdonotariseoutofanemployee’semploymentforpurposesoftheWorkers’
CompensationAct”ofColorado);Byrdv.RichardsonͲGreenshieldsSec.,Inc.,552So.2d1099n.7(Fla.1989)(sexual
harassmentisnotcoveredbyFlorida’sworkers’compensationactbecauseitdoesnot“ariseoutofemployment”).
194See,e.g.,Siscov.FabricationTechnologies,Inc.,350F.Supp.2d932,941Ͳ942(D.Wyo.2004)(workers’
compensationlawcoversonlymentalinjuriescausedbycompensablephysicalinjuries);Keransv.PorterPaintCo.,
61OhioSt.3d486,489,575N.E.2d428,431(1991)(“psychologicaldisturbancesarisingsolelyfromemotional
stress”arenotwithinworkers’compensationact’sdefinitionofinjury).
195SeeTANxxxͲxxxsupra.
FederalGeneralCommonLawofEmployment

44

oftheemployees’opportunitiestocommitthesetorts.Justasemployersaugmentthe
opportunitiesofemployeestoengageinharassmentbyinvestingtheemployeeswith
supervisoryauthorityoversubordinateemployees,sodoemployersaugmentopportunitiesfor
intentionaltortsbytheestablishmentofothersubordinateanddependentrelationships.These
relationshipsincludethoseofguardsandpolicewithprisonersorothercitizenssubjecttotheir
authorityandweapons,mentalhealthandothermedicalemployeeswiththeirpatients,
teacherͲemployeeswiththeirstudents,andclericalͲemployeeswiththeirparishioners.
 Notsurprisingly,whenemployeesinpositionsofpowerbecauseofsuchrelationships
haveabusedthatpowertocommitintentionaltorts,suchassexualorotherassaults,some
statecourtshavefashionedagencydoctrinetoimposestrictvicariousliabilityonemployers.196
Theyhavedonesoeitherbyexpandingtheconceptofascopeofemploymenttoincludeat
least“foreseeable”abusesofanemploymentposition197orbyabroadinterpretationofthe
“aidedbytheagencyrelationship”languagein§219(2)(d)oftheRestatementSecondof
Agency.198InDoev.Forrest,199theSupremeCourtofVermontindeedreliedontheCourt’s
interpretationof§219(2)(d)inFarragherandEllerthtoholdasheriff’sdepartmentliablefora
deputysheriff’ssexualassaultofacitizenthedeputyhadusedhisauthoritytoisolate.200
AlthoughtheForrestcourtdidnotadopttheFaragherͲEllerthaffirmativedefensecompromise,
itdidopenlyembracetheCourt’sroleininfluencingthedevelopmentofcommonlawdoctrine:

196JusticeSouterinhisFaragheropinion,see524U.S.at795Ͳ796,citedseveralofthesecases.See,e.g.,Primeaux
v.UnitedStates,102F.3d1458,1462Ͳ1463(8thCir.1996)(policeofficer’ssexualassaultofstrandedmotorist);
MaryM.v.LosAngeles,54Cal.3d202,216Ͳ221,285Cal.Rptr.99,107Ͳ111,814P.2d1341,1349Ͳ1352(1991)
(policeofficer’srapeofmotoristunderarrest);Doev.SamaritanCounselingCtr.,791P.12d344,348Ͳ349(Alaska
1990)(therapist’ssexualabuseofpatient).
197See,e.g.,Plummerv.CenterPsychiatrists,Ltd.,476S.E.2d172,174Ͳ175(Va.1996)(psychologistactedwithin
scopeofemploymentwhenhistherapysessionsincludedsexualintercoursewithpatient);RedElkv.United
States,62F.3d1102,1107(8thCir.1995)(applyingSouthCarolinalaw;“itwasalsoforeseeablethatamaleofficer
withauthoritytopickupateenagegirloutaloneatnightinviolationofthecurfewmightbetemptedtoviolatehis
trust”);Samuelsv.SouthernBaptistHospital,594So.2d571,573(La.App.4thCir.1992)(hospitalvicariouslyliable
fornursingassistant’srapeofpatientbecauserapewas“reasonablyincidentaltotheperformanceofhisduties”).
198See,e.g.,Doev.Forrest,176Vt.476,487Ͳ500,853A.2d48(2004)(sexualassaultofdeputysheriffoncashier
workingaloneataconveniencestore);seealsoWestv.Waymire,114F.3d646,649(7thCir.1997)(for“amale
policeofficerwhoseemployerhasinvestedhimwithintimidatingauthoritytodealinprivatewithtroubled
teenagegirls,histakingadvantageoftheopportunity…toextractsexualfavors…shouldbesufficientlywithinthe
orbitofhisemployerͲconferredpowerstobringthedoctrineofrespondeatsuperiorintoplay,eventhoughheis
notactingtofurthertheemployer’sgoalsbutinsteadisonafrolicofhisown”)(Posner,J.;dicta).
199176Vt.476(2004).
200Id.at500Ͳ504.
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 Itis,ofcourse,thenatureofthecommonlawthateveryappellatedecisionrepresents
 thedevelopmentofthecommonlaw,andnothingintheSupremeCourtdecisions
 suggeststheyarenotanintegralpartofthatprocess.Indeed,theresolutionofthe
 disputeoverthemeaningof§219(2)(d)inFaragherisexactlythekindofdecisionthat
 bestdefinesanddevelopsthecommonlaw.NocommonͲlawcourtengagedinthis
 process,andcertainlynotthehighestcourtofthiscountry,wouldexpectthata
 commonͲlawdecisionononesetoffactswouldhavenoinfluenceonfuturedecisions
 applyingthesamelegalprincipletoadifferentfactualscenario.201
 Mostcourts,however,haveresistedtheexpansionofemployervicariousliabilityfor
abusesofpowerbyrogueemployeesotherthanpoliceofficersandprisonguards.202The
FaragherͲEllerthdoctrineoffersaworkablecompromiseforacommonlawreformulationthat
recognizesthatemployersareusually,butnotalways,inabetterpositionthanarethirdͲparty
victimstocontroltheabuseofpowervestedinsuchemployeesasteachers,clerics,medical
professionals,andpoliceandsecuritypersonnel.Thesamepoliciesofdeterrenceandavoidable
consequencesuponwhichJusticesSouterandKennedyreliedinFaragherandEllerthcouldbe
invokedbyastatecourtintheadoptionofanaffirmativedefenseͲqualifiedvicariousemployer
liabilityfortortsbytheiremployeesonthirdpartiesinsubordinateordependentrelationships
arisingoutoftheemployees’employmentrelationship.
 

201Id.at490n.3.
202SeeDoev.NewburyBibleChurch,182Vt.174,933A.2d196(2007)(distinguishingForresttodeclinetoapply§
219(2)(d)topastor’ssexualmolestationofminorparishioner);Zsigov.HurleyMed.Ctr.,475Mich.215,716
N.W.2d220(2006)(nursingassistant’ssexualabuseofrestrainedpsychoticpatientnotwithinscopeof
employment);Grahamv.McGrath,363F.Supp.2d1030,1033Ͳ1034(S.D.Ill.2005)(applyingIllinoislaw;priest’s
sexualabuseofyoungparishionernotwithinscopeofemployment);JohnR.v.OaklandUnifiedSchoolDist.,48
Cal.3d438,769P.2d948,956(1989)(decliningtoimposevicariousliabilityonschooldistrictforteacher’ssexual
assaultonstudentbecause“teacher’sauthorityisdifferentinbothdegreeandkind”from“theauthorityofa
policeofficeroveramotorist”).
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IV.
ActionableEmployerRetaliation
 TheSupremeCourtthroughtheelaborationofthemeaningoffederalstatutesmay
influencethedevelopmentofgeneralstatelaw,includingstatecommonlaw,evenwithout
purportingtorelyonortomodifygeneralcommonlaw.Itmaydosobyprovidingaresolution
foralegalissueposedbyastatutethatisthesameasoratleastparalleltoanissueposedby
statelaw.AnexcellentexampleisprovidedbytheCourt’sinterpretationoftheantiͲretaliation
provisioninTitleVII203inBurlingtonNorthernv.White.204InthiscasetheCourtdefinedwhich
actionsofanemployeroritsagentsmaybeviolationsofTitleVII’santiͲretaliationprovisionif
takenagainstanemployeebecauseofthatemployee’sinvolvementinactivityprotectedbythe
provision.AlthoughtheCourt’sdefinitionwasonlyofferedasaninterpretationofthe
particularTitleVIIprovision,thedefinitionprovidedapossibleresolutionofaparallelproblem
posednotonlybyantiͲretaliationprovisionsinotherfederalemploymentstatutes,butalsoby
expressandimpliedantiͲretaliationprovisionsinstatestatutes,and,mostsignificantlyforthe
generalcommonlawofemployment,bythepublicpolicytortcauseofactionnowrecognized
insomeforminmostAmericanjurisdictions.205
 TheBurlingtonNorthernCourtinterpretedaprovisionthatmakesitunlawful“foran
employertodiscriminateagainst”anemployeeoremploymentapplicant“becausehehas
opposedanypractice”thatisotherwiseunlawfulunderTitleVIIor“becausehehasmadea
charge,testified,assisted,orparticipatedinanymannerinaninvestigation,proceeding,or
hearing”underTitleVII.206TheCourtstatedthatthecaserequireditto“characterizehow
harmfulanactofretaliatorydiscriminationmustbeinordertofallwithin[this]provision’s

203“Itshallbeanunlawfulemploymentpracticeforanemployertodiscriminateagainstanyofhisemployeesor
applicantsforemployment...becausehehasopposedanypracticemadeanunlawfulemploymentpracticeby
thissubchapter,orbecausehehasmadeacharge,testified,assisted,orparticipatedinanymannerinan
investigation,proceeding,orhearingunderthissubchapter.”42U.S.C.§2000eͲ3(a).
204548U.S.53(2006).
205SeeTANandnotesxxxͲxxxinfra.
20642U.S.C.§2000eͲ3(a).
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scope.”207ItdidsobyadoptinglanguagesuggestedbytwoCourtsofAppeals:“aplaintiffmust
showthatareasonableemployeewouldhavefoundthechallengedactionmateriallyadverse,
“whichinthiscontextmeansitwellmighthave‘dissuadedareasonableworkerfrommakingor
supportingachargeofdiscrimination.’””208TheCourtexplainedthatdeterminingwhethera
reasonableworkerwouldbedissuadedwouldprovidestrongprotectionofTitleVII’srightsto
pressandsupportchargesofdiscriminationwithoutimposingburdensomeregulationof“those
pettyslightsorminorannoyancesthatoftentakeplaceatwork”andthatarenotlikelytodeter
anemployee’sinvocationofhisorherprotectionagainstdiscrimination.TheCourtalso
stressedthatwhilethereasonableemployeestandardisnecessarilyobjective,itissufficiently
generaltobeflexiblyappliedinthecontextofvariantcircumstances,providingtheexampleof
anemployeewhoisresponsibleforthecareofyoungchildrenbeingsubjectedtoaschedule
change.209
 TheBurlingtonNorthernCourt’sinterpretivelawmakingwasfullypolicybased.Itdid
notpurporttoexpressageneralcommonlawdefaultrule,asdidtheCourtinReid,210
Darden,211andClackamas.212Nordidtheanalysispurporttobuildonormodifythecommon
law,asdidtheCourtinFaragherandEllerth.213Yetthepersuasiveforceoftheanalysiswasas
applicabletoanyprotectionagainstemployerretaliationasitwastotheprotectionaffordedby
theTitleVIIprovisionatissueinBurlingtonNorthern.IftheCourt’slegalformulationstruckthe
correctpolicybalanceforthisprovision,italsoarguablystruckthecorrectbalanceforageneral
commonlawdefaultruletobeadoptedbyfederalcourtsforotherfederalantiͲretaliation

207548U.S.at61.
208548U.S.at68.TheCourtquotedlanguagefromRochonv.Gonzales,438F.3d1211,1219(D.C.Cir.2006,which
hadinturnquotedfromWashingtonv.IllinoisDept.ofRevenue,420F.3d658,662(7thCir.2005).
209TheCourtalsopronouncedindictathatunlikeTitleVII’sprohibitionofstatusdiscrimination,TitleVII’santiͲ
retaliationprovision“extendsbeyondworkplaceͲrelatedoremploymentͲrelatedretaliatoryactsandharm.”548
U.S.at67.Thispronouncementwassuperfluousdictabecausetheemployeractionsfoundtoberetaliatoryinthe
case,thereassignmentoftheplaintifffromforkliftdutytostandardtracklaborertasksanda37Ͳdaysuspension
withoutpay,werebothclearlyworkplaceͲandemploymentͲrelatedactions.Thepronouncementmakesa
differenceinacaselikeRochon,supra,wheretheemployerwastheFederalBureauofInvestigationandits
retaliationtooktheformoftherefusaltofollowpolicyininvestigatingdeaththreatsafederalprisonermade
againsttheplaintiff.
210SeeTANxxsupra.
211SeeTANxxsupra.
212SeeTANxxxsupra.
213SeeTANxxxsupra.
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guaranteesandbystatecourtsforantiͲretaliationguaranteesinstatelawthatdonotcarry
specificstatutorydefinitionsofproscribedretaliatoryacts.
Thereareindeedmanysuchfederalandstatelawguarantees.Mostmodernfederal214
andstate,215andsomeolder,216statutesthatprovideprotectionsorminimumbenefitsto
employeesalsoincludeprovisionsthatprotectemployeesfromretaliationatleastforfiling
chargesorparticipatinginofficialproceedingstoenforcetheprotectionsorclaimthe
benefits.217Federalandstatelegislatorsseemtohaveappreciatedthatthesecuringofan
employeestatutoryright,liketherighttobefreeofparticularformsofstatusdiscrimination
securedbyTitleVII,requirestheprotectionfromretaliationofavictim’sinvocationoftheright.
Furthermore,fewantiͲretaliationprovisionsinfederalandstateemploymentstatutescarry
sufficientlylimitingdefinitionsofwhatretaliationsmightbeactionabletoobviatetheuseofa
commondefaultrulelikethatprovidedbyBurlingtonNorthern.218Notsurprisingly,therefore,
BurlingtonNorthernhasprovidedsucharulenotonlyforfederalstatutes,219butalsoformany

214See,e.g.,29U.S.C.§2615(a)((2)(antiͲretaliationprovisionofFamilyMedicalLeaveActof1993(FMLA));42
U.S.C.§12203(antiͲretaliationprovisionofAmericanswithDisabilitiesActof1990(ADA));29U.S.C.§1140(antiͲ
retaliationprovisionofEmploymentRetirementSecurityActof1974);29U.S.C.§660(c)(antiͲretaliationprovision
ofOccupationalSafetyandHealthActof1970);29U.S.C.§623(d)(antiͲretaliationprovisionofAgeDiscrimination
inEmploymentActof1967(ADEA)).
215See,e.g.,Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann.§41Ͳ1464(2010);Cal.Gov’tCodeAnn.§12940(g),(h)(West2014);Tex.Lab.code
Ann.§21.055(Vern.2013).
216See,forinstance,theantiͲretaliationprovisionofthe1938ͲenactedFairLaborStandardsAct(FLSA),29U.S.C.§
203etseq.Thisprovision,29U.S.C.§215(a)(3),alsocoverstheEqualPayAct,29U.S.C.§206(d),whichwas
passedin1963asanamendmenttotheFLSA.
217UnliketheantiͲretaliationprovisionofTitleVII,somestatutoryantiͲretaliationprovisionsbytheirexpressterms
protectonlyparticipationinofficialproceedingstoprotecttheunderlyingright.Forinstance,theFLSAprovision,
seenotexxxsupra,statesthatitisunlawfulforanyperson
Todischargeorinanymannerdiscriminateagainstanyemployeebecausesuchemployeehasfiledany
complaintorinstitutedorcausedotbeinstitutedanyproceedingsunderorrelatedtothischapter,orhas
testifiedorisabouttotestifyinanysuchproceeding....
29U.S.C.§215(a)(3).InKastenv.SaintͲGobainPerformancePlastics,xxxU.S.xxx,131S.Ct.1325(2011),theCourt
heldthatoralcomplaintsmaybeprotectedbythisprovision,butitleftopenwhethertheprovisionprotectsa
complainttoanemployerratherthantothegovernment.
 SeealsothedelineatedantiͲretaliationprovisionin§510oftheEmploymentRetirementIncomeSecurity
Actof1974,42U.S.C.1140.
218Noneofthefederalstatutescitedinnote214doso.
219See,e.g,Milleav.MetroͲNorth,658F.3d154,165Ͳ166(2dCir.2011)(joining“sistercircuits”inapplying
BurlingtonNortherntesttoantiͲretaliationprovisioninFMLA);Mogenhanv.Napolitano,613F.3d1162,1166Ͳ67
(D.C.Cir.2010)(applyingtesttoADAretaliationclaim);Naglev.VillageofcalumetPark,554F.3d1106,1121(7th
Cir.2009)(applyingtesttoADEAretaliationclaim);Ergov.Int’lMerchantsServices,Inc.,519F.Supp.2d765(N.D.
Ill.2007)(applyingtesttoFLSAretaliationclaim).
FederalGeneralCommonLawofEmployment

49

statestatuteswithexpressantiͲretaliationprovisionsthatdonotdefineprohibitedretaliatory
acts.220
Judgesinterpretingstatutesofferingbenefitsorprotectionstoemployeeswithout
inclusionofanexpressantiͲretaliationguaranteealsohaveappreciatedthatsuchaguaranteeis
necessarytomeetstatutorypurposes.Thus,boththeSupremeCourt221andthehighestcourts
ofnumerousstates222havefoundantiͲretaliationguaranteestobeimplicitingeneralstatutory
provisions.Forinstance,relyingonseveraldecadesofprecedent,223theCourtinGomezͲPerez
v.Potter224heldthattheprohibitionin§633a(a)of“discriminationbasedonage”inpersonnel
actionsinthefederalgovernment225“includesretaliationbasedonthefilingofanage
discriminationcomplaint,”eventhoughtheprovisiondoesnotreferexpresslyinanywayto
retaliation.226Thelackofanyexplicitreferencetoretaliationin§633a(a)obviouslyrendersthe

220See,e.g.,Gossardv.JPMorganChase&Co.,612F.Supp.2d1242,1252Ͳ1253(S.D.Fla.2009)(applying
BurlingtonNortherntoretaliationclaimunderFloridaCivilRightsAct,Fla.St.§760.10(7));Swansonv.Minnesota,
2008WL4375985(Minn.Dist.Ct.2008)(applyingBurlingtonNorthernstandardtoantiͲretaliationprovisionsof
MinnesotaWhistleblowerandOccupationalSafetyandHealthActs,Minn.Stat.§§181.932,Subd.1(a)and12654,
Subd.9);MontgomeryCountyv.Park,246S.W.3d610,614(Tex.2007)(“apersonnelactionisadversewithinthe
meaningtheWhistleblowerAct[Tex.Gov’tCode§554.002]ifitwouldbelikelytodissuadeareasonable,similarly
situatedworkerfrommakingareportundertheAct”);Secherestv.LearSieglerServices,Inc.,2007WL1186597
(M.D.Tenn.2007)(applyingBurlingtonNorthernstandardtoTennesseeHumanRightsAct,Tenn.CodeAnn.§4Ͳ
21Ͳ311);Niuv.RevcorMoldedProductsCo.,206S.W.3d723,731(Tex.App.ͲFt.Worth2006)(applyingBurlington
NortherntoantiͲretaliationprovisioninTexasLaborCode§21.055coveringemploymentdiscrimination).Butsee
Fincherv.DepositoryTrustandClearingCorp.,604F.3d712,723(2dCir.2010)(stressingthattheNewYorkCity
HumanRightsLaw,N.Y.C.Admin.code§8Ͳ107(7),makesitillegaltoretaliate“inanymanner”);Ivanv.Countyof
Middlesex,595F.Supp.2d425,470Ͳ71(D.N.J.2009)(decliningtoapplyBurlingtonNorthern“becausethelanguage
ofTitleVIIdiffersfromLAD[NewJerseyLawAgainstDiscrimination]asinterpretedbyNewJerseycourts”).
221SeeTANandnotexxxinfra.
222SeeTANandnotexxxinfra.
223TheCourtreliedprimarilyonSullivanv.LittleHuntingPark,Inc.,326U.S.299(1969)(findingthatthe
prohibitionofracediscriminationinpropertytransactionsin42U.S.C.§1982makescognizableaclaimfor
retaliationforopposingracediscriminationinhousing)andJacksonv.BirminghamBd.ofEduc.,544U.S.167
(2005)(implyingprotectionagainstretaliationforfilingacomplaintwiththegovernmentfromtheprohibitionof
genderdiscriminationinTitleIXoftheEducationAmendmentsof1972,20U.S.C.§1681).TheCourtinJackson
statedthat“whenafundingrecipientretaliatesagainstapersonbecausehecomplainsofsexdiscrimination,this
constitutesintentionaldiscrimination‘onthebasisofsex,’inviolationofTitleIX.”Id.at174.
224553U.S.474(2008).
22529U.S.C.
226GomezͲPerezv.Potter,553U.S.474,479(2008).SeealsoCBOCSWest,Inc.v.Humphries,553U.S.442(2008),
wheretheCourtheldthat42U.S.C.§1981’sprohibitionofraceͲbasedemploymentdiscriminationinemployment
contractssupportsaclaimofretaliationforopposingsuchdiscrimination.WhethertheCourt’simplicationofa
remedyforretaliationinGomezͲPerez,CBOCSWest,andJackson,seenotexxxsupra,inordertoensurefulfillment
ofstatutorypurpose,wasanappropriateuseofjudicialpowerisbeyondthescopeofthisessay.JusticesThomas
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impliedretaliationprohibitioninneedofsomestandard,likethatprovidedbyBurlington
Northern,todefinewhichemployeractionscouldconstituteillegalretaliation.
Similarly,inKelsayv.Motorola,Inc.,227theSupremeCourtofIllinoisheldthat
employeesmusthaveacauseofactionforretaliationtoensureimplementationofthe
purposesoftheIllinois’sWorkmen’sCompensationAct:
“thelegislatureenactedtheworkmen’scompensationlawasacomprehensivescheme
toprovideforefficientandexpeditiousremediesforinjuredemployees.Thisscheme
wouldbeseriouslyunderminedifemployerswerepermittedtoabusetheirpowerto
terminatebythreateningtodischargeemployeesforseekingcompensationunderthe
Act....whenfacedwithsuchadilemmamanyemployees,whosecommonlawrights
havebeensupplantedbytheAct,wouldchoosetoretaintheirjobs,andthus,ineffect,
wouldbeleftwithoutaremedyeithercommonlaworstatutory.Thisresult...is
untenableandiscontrarytothepublicpolicyasexpressedintheWorkmen’s
CompensationAct.”228

andScalia,whoclaimtorejectpurposeͲbasedstatutoryinterpretations,dissentedinallthreecases.See553U.S.
atxxx;553U.S.atxxx;544U.S.atxxx.
22774Ill.2d172,384N.E.2d353(1978).
22874Ill.2dat181Ͳ182.ItisnotclearbutmakesnorealdifferencewhethertheKelsaycourt,inthemannerofthe
CourtinGomezͲPerez,foundtheretaliationcauseofactiontobeimpliedintheIllinoisstatuteorratherpurported
toexerciseitscommonlawmakingpowerinthecreationoftheretaliationcauseofaction.Astatecourt,however,
wouldhavetoassertitsfullcommonlawmakingpowerinordertocreatearightofactionagainstretaliationfor
assertingarightunderafederallaw.See,e.g.,Flenkerv.WilliametteIndustries,Inc.,2666Kan.198,967P.2d295
(1998)(holdingthattheremedyforretaliationforassertingarightunderthefederalOccupationalSafetyand
HealthActdoesnotprecludeastatecommonlawcauseofactionforwrongfuldischargeforassertingtheright).
Foradecisionmoreclearlyrelyingonaworkers’compensationstatute,ratherthangeneralcommonlawmaking
authority,toimplyacauseofactionforretaliatorytermination,seeFramptonv.CentralIndianaGasCo.,260Ind.
249,252,297N.E.2d425(1973)(notingstatutestatesthatno“deviceshall...relieveanyemployer...ofany
obligationcreatedbythisact”).Fordecisionsinotherjurisdictionscreatingorimplyingacauseofactionfor
retaliatoryterminationfortheexerciseofrightsunderaworker’scompensationstatute,see,e.g.,Shickv.Shirey,
716A.2d1231(Pa.1998);Kreinv.MarianManorNursingHome,415N.W.2d793(N.D.1987);Griessv.Consol.
Freightways,776P.2d752(Wyo.1989);Clantonv.ClaimͲSloanCo.,677S.W.2d441(Tenn.1984);Hansenv.
Harrah’s,675P.2d394(Nev.1984);FirestoneTextileCo.v.Meadows,666S.W.2d730(Ky.1983).Statecourtsalso
haveimpliedrightsofactionagainstretaliationforassertingrightsunderotherkindsofemployeeprotectionor
benefitstatutes.See,e.g.,Highhousev.AveryTransp.,443Pa.Super.120,127,660A.2d1374,1378(Pa.Super.
Ct.1995)(rightofactionagainstdischargeforclaimingunemploymentcompensation);Larav.Thomas,512
N.W.2d777,782(Iowa1994)(rightofactionagainstdischargeforfilingpartialunemploymentcompensation
claim).
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LiketheSupremeCourt’simplicationofaprohibitionofretaliationinanantiͲdiscrimination
provisionincaseslikeGomezͲPerez,astatecourt’screationofacauseofactionforunlawful
terminationincaseslikeKelsaywithouttheguidanceofanyspecificstatutorydirectives
requiresaskingapolicyquestionthatwasansweredgenerallyinBurlingtonNorthern:If
protectionsagainstterminationarenecessarytoensureunderlyingstatutoryrights,which
employeractionsaresufficientlysignificanttowarrantacognizableclaim?229 
 Indeed,thepotentialutilityofthegenerallawmakinginBurlingtonNorthernforstate
lawisevenmoresignificantbecauseofothermodificationsoverthepastseveraldecadesinthe
commonlawemploymentͲatͲwilldefaultprinciple.Thatprincipleofcoursegenerallyconstrues
employmentforanindefinitetermasterminableatthewillofeitherpartyforanyreason.230It
hasbeenqualifiedbyantiͲdiscriminationandotherstatutesandbytheimplicationofcausesof
actionlikethosedescribedabovetoensuretheprotectionofemployeerights.231Italsohas
beenqualifiedinthecurrenterabythecreationofotheractionsforwrongfuldischargein
violationofpublicpolicy.Someofthislawmakinghasbeenfashionedbystatelegislaturesin
statutesprotectiveofwhistleblowers.232

229AlthoughtheIllinoisSupremeCourtdeclinedtoextendtheretaliatorydischargecauseofactionitrecognizedin
Kelsaytoacaseofretaliatorydemotion,seeZimmermanv.BuchheitofSparta,164Ill.2d29,206Ill.Dec.625,645
N.E.2d877(1994),courtsinotherjurisdictionshaveexpandedtheprotectionofworkers’compensationclaimants
tocoverotherformsofretaliation.Forinstance,inTrosperv.Bar“NSave,273Neb.855,734N.W.2d704(2007),
theSupremeCourtofNebraskaheldthatacauseofactionforretaliatorydemotionexistsagainstanemployerthat
demotesanemployeeforfilingaworkers’compensationclaim.Inhisconcurringopinion,JudgeGerrardexplained
that“undueinterferencewiththeemploymentrelationship”couldbeavoidedbydelimitingthecauseofaction
basedontheBurlingtonNortherndefinitionofmateriallyadverse.Id.at871.Seealso,e.g.,Robelv.Roundup
Corp.,148Wn.2d35,49Ͳ50,59P.3d611(2002)(Washingtonstatutethatstatesanemployermaynot
“discriminate”againstanemployerforfilingacompensationclaimmaycoverretaliatoryverbalharassment);
Brighamv.DillonCompanies,Inc.,262Kan.12,20,935P.2d1054(1997)(“causeofactionforretaliatorydemotion
isanecessaryandlogicalextensionofthecauseofactionforretaliatorydischarge”).Brighamisdiscussedfurther
atTANxxxinfra.
230TheemploymentͲatͲwilldefaultruleisrecognizedinallAmericanjurisdictions,exceptMontanawhichhas
enactedastatuterequiringashowingof“goodcause”forallterminationsofanemployee’semploymentafterthe
employee’scompletionofaprobationaryperiod.SeeMontanaWrongfulDischargeofEmploymentAct.Mont.
Code§§39Ͳ2Ͳ901to914.Forahistoryoftheoriginoftherule,seeJayM.Feinman,TheDevelopmentofthe
EmploymentAtWillRule,20Amer.J.ofLegalHist.118(1976).
231SeeTANxxxͲxxxsupra.
232See,e.g.,Cal.LaborCode§1102.5;Fla.Stat.§448.102;Ill.Stat.430/15Ͳ10;Mich.Comp.Laws§§15.361Ͳ15.368;
Minn.Stat.§181.932;N.J.Stat.§§34:19Ͳ1to§9Ͳ8;N.Y.LaborLawart.20ͲC§740;43Pa.Stat.Ann.§§1421Ͳ28.
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Theprimaryimpetusforthewrongfuldischargeinviolationofpublicpolicycauseof
action,however,hascomefromthejudiciary.Statecourtshaveexercisedtheircommonlaw
makingauthoritytorecognizesuchactionsnotonlytosecureemployeerights,asinKelsay,but
alsotoservebroaderpublicpurposesincaseswhereadischargedemployeeisterminatedfor
performingapublicdutydefinedbylaw,233forrefusingtocommitanactthatviolatessomelaw
orperhapscodeofprofessionaloroccupationalconduct,234orforreportingorinquiringabout
illegalemployerconduct.235
Statecourtshavecreatedsuchactionsforwrongfuldischargetoservepublicpolicy
definedbyotherauthoritativelaworcodemakingbodies.236Theyhavedonesorecognizing
thatsuchpublicpolicymaybeunderminedifemployeesarediscouragedbythethreatof
dischargefromactinginconformitywithortoadvancetherulessetbythatpolicy.Such
recognition,however,posesthequestionofwhetheremployeesshouldbeprotectedfrom
retaliationthroughotherformsofdiscipline,shortoftermination.Ifemployeescanbe
discouragedfromservingapublicinterestbythethreatoftermination,couldtheyalsonotbe
discouragedbyademotionorsuspensionorpaycut?Ifastaterecognizessomepublicpolicyas
sufficientlystrongtocompromiseanemployer’srighttodefinetheboundsoftheemployment
relationship,whynotrecognizeisassufficientlystrongtoqualifyanemployer’sdiscretionover
disciplineshortoftermination?

233See,e.g.,Texlerv.NorfolkS.Ry.,957F.Supp.772(M.D.N.C.1997)(testifyingtruthfullyatdeposition;applying
NorthCarolinalaw);Paradav.CityofColon,29Cal.Rptr.2d309(Cal.Ct.App.1994)(issuingstopordersagainst
constructionprojectsfailingtosatisfypermitrequirements);Neesv.Hock,536P.2d512(Or.1975)(performance
ofjuryduty)
234See,e.g.,Hobsonv.McLeanHosp.Corp.,522N.E.2d975(Mass.1988)(refusingtoallowsupervisednursesto
violatestatelawincheckingpatients);Phippsv.ClarkOil&RefiningCorp.,408N.W.2d569(Minn.1987)(refusing
topumpleadedgasintocarbuiltforunleadedgasinviolationoffederallaw);Kalmanv.GrandUnionCo.,443A.2d
728(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1982)(refusingtoclosepharmacyinviolationofstatelaw).
235See,e.g.Kanagyv.FiestaSalons,Inc.,541S.E.2d616(W.Va.2000)(reportingunlicensedpracticeof
cosmetologytoregulatingboard);Greenv.RaleeEng’gCo.,960P.2d1046(Cal.1998)(reportingtomanagement
aboutaircraftpartsthattheemployeereasonablybelievedwasillegal);Palmateerv.Int’lHarvesterCo.,421N.E.2d
876(Ill.1981)(supplyinginformationaboutemployeethefttolawenforcementofficers).
236Somecourtshaverecognizedestablishedprinciplesofprofessionaloroccupationalconductthathavereceived
judicialorotherpublicsanctionasasourceofpublicpolicyforthewrongfuldischargeinviolationofpublicpolicy
tort.See,e.g.,LoPrestiv.RutlandRegionalHealthServices,Inc.,865A.2d1102(Vt.2004)(medicalethicalcode
maybesourceofpublicpolicy);RockyMountainHosp.andMed.Serv.V.Mariani,916P.2d519(Colo.1996)
(publicpolicysetbyColoradoStateBoardofAccountancyRulesofProfessionalConduct);Shearinv.E.F.Hutton
Group,Inc.,652A.2d578(Del.Ch.1994)(attorney’sdutytoreportwrongdoingofemployerundercodeofethics
isabasisforpublicpolicy).
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Afewstatecourtsindeedhaveunderstoodthatrecognitionofatortofwrongful
disciplineisalogicalcorollarytothetortofwrongfuldischargeinviolationofpublicpolicy.As
explainedbytheSupremeCourtofKansasinBrighamv.DillonCompanies:
Toconcludeotherwisewouldbetorepudiatethiscourt’srecognitionofacauseof
actionforretaliatorydischarge.Theobviousmessagewouldbeforemployersto
demoteratherthandischargeemployeesinretaliationforfilingaworkers
compensationclaimorwhistleblowing.Thusemployerscouldnegatethiscourt’s
decisionsrecognizingwrongfulorretaliatorydischargebytakingactionfallingshortof
actualdischarge.237
Thisrecognition,however,liketherecognitionofanyactionforretaliation,begsthequestionof
scopeforwhichtheBurlingtonNorthernholdingsuppliesasensibledefaultanswer.
Thisquestionofscopeforawrongfuldisciplinecauseofactionwasconsideredinthe
draftingoftheRestatementThirdofEmploymentLaw.CitingdecisionslikeBrighamandnoting
thatthereare“fewreportedcases[that]involveemployeeswhohavenotbeendischarged,or
quitandallegedconstructivedischarge,”theRestatementThirdofEmploymentinadraft
tentativelyapprovedbytheALImembershipinMay,2009,statedatortof“EmployerDiscipline
inViolationofPublicPolicy.”DrawingfromBurlingtonNorthern,§4.01ofthatdraftcovered
“anactionshortofdischargethatisreasonablylikelytodeterasimilarlysituatedemployee
fromengaginginprotectedactivity,includinganactionthatsignificantlyaffectsemployee
compensationorworkingconditions.”238

237262Kan.12,20,935P.2d1054,1060(1997).Seealso,e.g.,Powersv.SpringfieldCitySchs.,1998WL336782
(OhioCt.App.June26,1998)(claimofwrongfulfailuretopromoteforperformingdutytoreportchildabuse);
Garciav.RockwellInt’lcorp.,232CalRptr.490(Cal.Ct.App.1986)(claimofwrongfulsuspensionanddemotionfor
revealingmischargingtoNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration);Trosperv.Bag‘NSave,supranotexxx..
238Section4.01(b)oftheRestatementThirdofEmploymentLaw(TentativeDraftNo.22009).Section4.01ofthis
draftstatedinfull:
 §4.01EmployerDisciplineinViolationofPublicPolicy
(a) Anemployerthatdischargesortakesothermaterialadverseactionagainstanemployee
becausetheemployeehasorwillengageinprotectedactivityunder§4.02issubjectto
liabilityintortforwrongfuldisciplineinviolationofpublicpolicy,unlessthestatueorother
lawthatformsthebasisoftheapplicablepublicpolicyprecludestortliabilityorotherwise
makesinappropriatejudicialrecognitionofatortclaim.
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Tobesure,amajorityofthosecourtsthathaveconsideredexpandingthecommonlaw
claimofwrongfuldischargetoincludeotheradversepersonnelactions,havedeclinedtodoso,
inpartbecauseofconcernaboutadditionalregulationofemployers’personneldiscretion.239
Indeed,thefinalRestatementThirdofEmploymentdraft,indeferencetothisjudicial
reluctancetoexpandthetortofwrongfuldischarge,doesnotcoverwrongfuldisciplineshortof
thatwhichissufficientlyintolerabletowarrantareasonableemployee’sresignation,i.e.a
constructivedischarge.240TheBurlingtonNortherntestnonethelessremainsausefulstandard
foranyjurisdictionthatadoptsacomprehensivecauseofactionforwrongfuldiscipline,either
throughjudicialorlegislativelawmaking.
V.
VicariousEmployerLiabilityforPunitiveDamages
 Notallfederallawmakingeffectedthroughtheinterpretationoffederalstatutescanbe
expectedtoinfluencethegeneralcommonlawofthestates,however.Theremaybegood
reasonswhynewlyformulatedlegaldoctrineannouncedasaninterpretationofafederal
statutewillnotinfluencetheresolutionofparallelissuesinstatelawevenwhenthenew
formulationpurportstobuildonorrefinethegeneralcommonlaw.First,theresolutionofthe
parallelissuesunderstatecommonlawmaybewellestablishedineachjurisdiction,evenifnot

(b) “Othermaterialadverseaction”inthisSectionmeansanactionshortofdischargethatis
reasonablylikelytodeterasimilarlysituatedemployeefromengaginginprotectedactivity,
includinganactionthatsignificantlyaffectsemployeecompensationorworkingconditions.
239See,e.g.,Jewettv.Gen.DynamicsCorp.,1997WL255093(Conn.Super.Ct.1997)(notrecognizingclaimfor
retaliatorydemotion):Mintzv.BellAtl.Sys.LeasingInt’l,Inc.,183Ariz.550,553,905P.2d559,562(Ariz.Ct.App.
1995)(“tortofwrongfulfailureͲtoͲpromotedoesnotpresentlyexist”);Hindov.Univ.ofHealthScis.,604N.E.2d
463,468(Ill.App.Ct.1992)(notrecognizingclaimforretaliatorydemotion).
240ThisfinaldraftwillbepresentedtotheALIMembershipforfinalapprovalinMay,2014.Thedraftdeleted
“othermaterialadverseaction”fromtheblackletter,to“reflect[]themajorityviewofthejurisdictionsaddressing
theissue.”Seecommentc.toSection5.01(b)oftheRestatementThirdofEmploymentLaw(CouncilDraftNo.11
2013)(inthisdraftChapter4hasbecomeChapter5).Commentc.alsoexplainedthatwrongfuldischarge“covers
claimsforwrongfuldischarge,”andthat“[a]nemployerconstructivelydischargesanemployeeiftheemployer
createsworkingconditionssointolerablethatareasonableemployeeunderthecircumstanceswouldbe
compelledtoquit,andtheemployeeinfactquits.”Id.
ThisstandardforconstructivedischargewasendorsedbytheCourtinPennsylvaniaStatePolicev.Suders,
542U.S.129(2004).Seenotexxxsupra.Courtshaverecognizedthatthetortofwrongfuldischargewouldbe
withoutsubstantialpracticalmeaningifitdidnotcoveremployeractionsthatmadecontinuationofwork
intolerableforreasonableemployees.See,e.g.,Strozinskyv.Sch.Dist.,237Wisc.2d19,66Ͳ67,614N.W.2d443
(2000).
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setinthesamemannerinall.Second,thenewformulationmaybedependentonapolicy
balancemadeininterpretationofthefederallawthatisnotpersuasivetostatecourtsmaking
differentpolicybalancesundertheirownlaw.241
Anexampleoffederaljudicialemploymentlawmakingwhichshouldnotbeinfluential
forthesereasonsisprovidedbytheCourt’smodificationinKolstadv.AmericanDental
Association242oftheapproachoftheRestatementSecondofAgency243andoftheRestatement
SecondofTorts244(RestatementRule)totheimpositionofpunitivedamagesonemployersfor
thetortsoftheiragents.AfterfirstholdingthattheTitleVIIstandardofculpabilityforthe
impositionofpunitivedamagesissubjectiveknowledgeofariskofactinginviolationoflaw,245
theCourtinKolstadalsoheldthatemployersshouldnotbeliableforpunitivedamagesfortheir
agents’knowingviolationofTitleVII,evenincaseswheretheRestatementRule’sstandardof
employercomplicitythroughmanagerialagentsismet,if“thediscriminatoryemployment
decisionof[the]managerialagents”were“contrarytotheemployer’s‘goodͲfaitheffortsto
complywithTitleVII.”246

TheKolstadCourt’sreasonsformodifyingtheRestatementRuleforpurposesofTitle
VII,thoughpotentiallyapplicabletoageneralcommonlawrule,werenotsufficiently

241Neitherofthesereasonsseemapplicabletothepotentialfederalcontributionstothegeneralcommonlawof
employmentthusfarconsideredinthisarticle.Forinstance,thedefinitionofemployeehasneverbeenfully
crystallizedbecauseoftheflexibilityofthemultifactortests,seeTANxxͲxxsupra,andtheexclusionofcontrolling
ownersfromthisdefinitiononlyhasbecomesalientrecently,seeTANxxͲxxsupra.Further,asarguedabove,the
SupremeCourt’sdecisionsinClackamas,seeTANxxsupra,FaragherͲEllerth,seeTANxxͲxxsupra,andBurlington
Northern,seeTANxxxͲxxxsupra,carrypersuasiverationalesthatcouldinfluencethedevelopmentofunsettled
generalcommonlaw.
242527U.S.526,545Ͳ546(1999).
243Section217CoftheRestatementSecondofAgencystates:
“Punitivedamagescanproperlybeawardedagainstamasterorotherprincipalbecauseofanactbyanagentif,
butonlyif:
(a) theprincipalauthorizedthedoingandthemanneroftheact,or
(b) theagentwasunfitandtheprincipalwasrecklessinemployinghim,or
(c) theagentwasemployedinamanagerialcapacityandwasactinginthescopeofemployment,or
(d) theprincipaloramanagerialagentoftheprincipalratifiedorapprovedtheact.
244Section909oftheRestatementSecondofTortsstatesthesameformulationasthatin§217Cofthe
RestatementSecondofAgency.Seenotexxxsupra.TheRestatementThirdofAgency,§7.03cmt.e,at156Ͳ160,
endorsestheapproachof§909,interpretingittoprovidethat“unlessatortfeasorisamanagerialagent,punitive
damagesmaybeawardedonlywhentheculpabilityofthemanagerialagentcanbeshown.Id.at158.
245527U.S.at535Ͳ536.
246526U.S.at545Ͳ546.
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persuasivetohavealikelysalutaryeffectonthecommonlawofmoststates.TheRestatement
RuleallowspunitivedamageswhenthetortͲcommittingagentwasemployedinamanagerial
capacityandwasactinginthescopeofemployment,orwhenamanagerialagentratifiedor
approvedthetortiousact.247JusticeO’ConnorinheropinionfortheKolstadCourtexpresses
dissatisfactionwithbasingemployerliabilityforpunitivedamagesontheculpabilityofsome
managerwhentheemployer“himselfispersonallyinnocentandthereforeliableonly
vicariously”248becausehehas“undertakengoodfaitheffortsatcompliance.”249Justice
O’Connor’spersonalizationofemployersisadistortionoftherealityofthemoderneconomy,
however.Mostemployersarelegalentitiesthatactonlythroughtheirhumanagents.Itisnot
obviouswhyanemployerthatemploysculpablemanagerialdecisionmakingagents250should
bedescribedasinnocent.
JusticeO’ConnoralsoassertedthatadoptingtheRestatementRuleonemployerliability
forpunitivedamages“wouldreducetheincentiveforemployerstoimplement
antidiscriminationprograms.”251Thisassertionseemsillogical.Thegreateranemployer’s
vulnerabilitytopunitivedamages,thegreatertheincentivetoimplementantidiscrimination
programstoensuretheavoidanceofdiscriminationthatcouldresultinonerousdamage
awards.AlsounconvincingisJusticeO’Connor’ssuggestionthatadoptionoftheRestatement
Rule,intandemwiththeunderlyingTitleVIIknowingviolationstandardforpunitive
damages,252wouldpenalize“thosewhoeducatethemselvesandtheiremployeesonTitleVII’s
prohibitions.”253FewofficersanddecisionmakerstodaydonotunderstandthebasicantiͲ

247Seenotexxxsupra.
248527U.Sat544,quotingRestatementSecondofTorts,§909,at468,cmt.b.
249527U.S.at544.
250AsstatedintheRestatementThirdofAgency,§7.03cmt.e,at159,thedeterminationofwhetheranagentisa
“managerialagent”“shouldfocusontheagent’sdiscretiontomakedecisionsthatwouldhavepreventedthe
injurytotheplaintifforthatdeterminepoliciesoftheorganizationrelevanttotheriskthatresultedintheinjury.”
251527U.S.at544.
252ThisfirstpartoftheKolstaddecisionconfirmedthatthe“malice”or“recklessindifference”standardforthe
grantofpunitivedamagesforTitleVIIviolations,see42U.S.C.§1981a(b)(1),“doesnotrequireashowingof
egregiousoroutrageousdiscriminationindependentoftheemployer’sstateofmind,”but“pertain[s]tothe
employer’sknowledgethatitmaybeactinginviolationoffederallaw,notitsawarenessthatitisengagingin
discrimination.”527U.S.at535.
253527at544.
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discriminationprohibitionsofTitleVII;effectiveantiͲdiscriminationprogramsrequiremuch
morethaneducation.
Ofcourseprovidingamaximumincentivetoavoidtortiousactsisnottheonly
considerationinsettingrulesforpunitivedamages,asitisnottheonlyconsiderationinsetting
anyliabilityrules.Moreeasilyavailablepunitivedamagescanresultininefficientlevelsof
avoidance,regulation,andlitigation,dependingonthelikelihoodofrecoveryandthelevelof
damages.Ultimately,settingrulesforpunitivedamagesrequiresadifficultpolicybalancethat
alsotakesintoaccountthedegreetowhichthesubstantivelawbeingenforcedmaycarrya
moralcondemnationofitsintentional,reckless,orevennegligentviolators.OnereasonJustice
O’Connor’s“badfaith”overlayontheRestatementRulelikelywillnotbeinfluentialisthatshe
failedtoengagedirectlywiththisdifficultbalancing.
AmoreimportantreasonthattheKolstadCourt’smodificationoftheRestatementRule
willnothavesubstantialinfluenceonthegeneralcommonlawisthatthestatesalreadyhave
settheirownpolicybalanceinvariantbutwellestablishedways,bothbystatuteandbyjudicial
decision.254Unliketheothercommonlawrulesdiscussedinthisarticle,therulesgoverning
employerpunitiveliabilitydonotseemopentodevelopmentormodificationtowardsome
generalcommonlawconsensus.First,statessetdifferentstandardsfortheleveloffault
requiredfortheawardofpunitivedamages,255withafewjurisdictionsnotallowinganyawards
ofpunitivedamagesatallincommonlawactions.256Ofthosejurisdictionsthatdoallowsuch

254SeenotesxxxͲxxxinfra.
255Somejurisdictionsrequireaconsciousdesiretoinjure,whilesomeallowtheimpositionofpunitivedamages
basedonrecklessnessorevengrossnegligence.Compare,e.g.,Robyv.McKessonCorp.,47Cal.4th686,712,219
P.3d749,765(2009)(punitivedamagesareavailableunderCaliforniaCiv.Code§3294,subd.(a),“whereitis
provenbyclearandconvincingevidencethatthedefendanthasbeenguiltyofoppression,fraud,ormalice.”);
DarcarsMotorsofsilverspring,Inc.v.Borzym,379Md.249,264,841A.2d828,837(2004)(punitivedamages
require“actualmalice”whichis“characterizedbyevilmotive,intenttoinjure,illwill,orfraud.”);withSlovinskiv.
Elliot,237Ill.2d51,58,927N.E.2d1221,1225(2010)(punitivedamagesavailable“whenthedefendantacts
willfully,orwithsuchgrossnegligenceastoindicateawantondisregardoftherightsofothers.”)andPhillipsv.
CricketLighters,584Pa.179,189,883A.2d439,446(2005)(punitivedamagesareavailablefor“intentional,
willful,wantonorrecklessconduct.”)MassachusettshasnotacceptedtheKolstadculpabilitystandard,seenote
xxxsupra,evenforitsownparallelgeneralantidiscriminationlaw.See,e.g.,Haddadv.WalͲMart,455Ma.91,110,
914N.E.2d59(2009)(punitivedamagesmaybeawardedwhenthedefendant’sconductis“outrageousor
egregious”).
256See,e.g.,Haddad,supra,at110(“Weimposepunitivedamagesonlywhenauthorizedbystatute”);Laramiev.
Stone,160N.H.419,433,999A.2d262(N.H.2010)(“NewHampshiredoesnothavepunitivedamages.”);Corona
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damages,manyhavesetlawforemployerliabilitythatvarieswidelyfromtheRestatement
Rule.Somejurisdictionsallowtheawardofpunitivedamagesagainstemployersfortorts
committedbyemployeesactingwithinthescopeoftheiremploymentwiththerequisitemens
rea.257Anumberofotherjurisdictions,incontrast,bystatuteorjudicialdecisionaremore
restrictiveofemployerliabilitythanistheRestatementRule.258
Tobesure,numerousjurisdictionshaveadoptedtheRestatementRulebystatuteor
judicialdecision.259Butfewofthosejurisdictions,orothers,havebeeninfluencedbythe
KolstadmodificationoftheRestatementapproach.Statecourtcitationsofthismodification
seemtohavebeenlimitedtodictainafewdecisionsinterpretingstatestatutes.260Not

deCamargov.Schon,278Neb.1045,1053,776N.W.2d1,9(Neb.2009)(punitivedamagesnotrecoverablefor
anytorts);Barrv.InterbayCitizensBankofTampa,Fla.,96Wash.2d692,697,635P.2d441,443(Wash.1981)
(“Underthelawofthisstate,punitivedamagesarenotallowedunlessexpresslyauthorizedbythelegislature.”).
257See,e.g.,Biermanv.AramarkRefreshmentServices,Inc.,198P.3d877,884(Okla.2008);Dewitskyv.Pittson
LumberandMfg.Co.,82Pa.D.&C.4th18,22(Pa.Com.Pl.2007);Floodex.rel.Oakleyv.Holzwarth,182S.W.3d673
(Mo.App.S.D.2005);Johannesenv.SalemHosp.,336Or.211,219,82P.3d139,142()r.2003);InfinityProducts,
Inc.v.Quandt,775N.E.2d1144,1154(Ind.App.2002);Wiperv.DowntownDevelopmentCorp.ofTucson,152
Ariz.309,310,732P.2d200,201(Ariz.1987);Embreyv.Holly,293Md.128,135,442A.2d966,970(Md.1982).
258See,e.g.,Cavuotiv.NewJerseyTransitCorp.,161N.J.107,113,735A.2d548,551(1999)(insuitunderstate
antidiscriminationstatute,plaintiffmustshow“actualparticipationinorwillfulindifferencetothewrongful
conductonthepartofuppermanagement”and“proofthattheoffendingconduct[is]especiallyegregious.”);
Loughryv.LincolnFistBank,N.A.,67N.Y.2d369,494N.E.2d70,76,502N.Y.S.2d965,971(1988)(“Theagent’s
levelofresponsibilitywiththeentityshouldbesufficientlyhighthathisparticipationinthewrongdoingrenders
theemployerblameworthy,andarousesthe‘institutionalconscience’forcorrectiveaction.”);N.C.G.S.A.§1DͲ
15(c)(NorthCarolinastatuteproviding:“Punitivedamagesshallnotbeawardedagainstapersonsolelyonthe
basisofvicariousliabilityfortheactsoromissionsofanother.Punitivedamagesmaybeawardedagainstaperson
onlyifthatpersonparticipatedintheconductconstitutingtheaggravatingfactorgivingrisetothepunitive
damages,orif,inthecaseofacorporation,theofficers,directors,ormanagersofthecorporationparticipatedin
orcondonedtheconductconstitutingtheaggravatingfactorgivingrisetopunitivedamages.”)
259See,e.g.,CountrywideHomeLoans,Inc.v.Thitchener,124Nev.725,192P.3d243(Nev.2008)(applying
Nev.Rev.Stat.42.007);Boykinv.PerkinsFamilyRestaurant,2002WL4548(Minn.Spp.2002)(applying,in
employee’ssexualharassmentcase,Minn.Stat.§549.20,subd.2(2000));Weeksv.Baker&McKenzie,63
Cal.App.4th1128,1150,74Cal.Rptr.2d510,523(Cal.App.1Dist.1998)(applyingCal.Civ.Code§3294(b));Beriner
v.Hyslop,337N.W.2d858,861(Iowa1983);Fitzgeraldv.Edelen,623P.2d418,423(Colo.App.1980);
Mattyasovszkyv.WestTownsBus.Co.,61Ill.2d31,36,330N.E.2d509,512(1975).
260Shoucairv.BrownUniversity,917A.2d418,433Ͳ436(R.I.2007)(discussingKolstadincaseunderRhodeIsland’s
FairEmploymentPracticesAct,butdecidingnottoimposepunitivedamagesonemployerbecauseofRhode
Island’sownrestrictivecommonlawruleonemployerliability);(dictasuggestingthatKolstadmayhavechanged
lawprospectivelyunderTexasHumanRightsAct);Whitev.Ultamar,Inc.,21Cal.4th563,568,981P.2d944,948n.2
(1999)(dictaindicatingthatKolstadmayhaverelevanceinfuturecasesunderCalifornia’sstatuteoncorporate
liabilityforpunitivedamages,Cal.Civ.Code§3294(b)).Butcf.,e.g.,Jordanv.BatesAdvertisingHoldings,Inc.,816
N.Y.S.2d310,322(N.Y.Supp.2006)(incontrasttoKolstad’sinterpretationoffederallaw,“theNewYorkCity
HumanRightsLawhasmadegoodfaithcomplianceproceduresonlyafactortobeconsideredinmitigationof
punitivedamages,ratherthanacompletedefense”).
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surprisingly,becauseofthevarianceofstatelaw261andtheKolstaddecisionnotprovidingan
adequateunifyingprinciple,theRestatementThirdofEmploymentLawdoesnotattemptto
restategeneralcommonlawontheissueofemployerliabilityforpunitivedamages.
VI.
Conclusion–AFederalͲStateLawmakingEnterprise
 Theseillustrationsdemonstratethepotentialforfederalcourtparticipationina
dynamicgeneralcommonlawmakingprocess,oneinwhichfederalcourtlawmakingthrough
theinterpretationofstatutescanaffectstatecommonlawinthesamemannerasfederal
commonlawmakingintheageofSwift,throughpersuasion,ratherthaninthemannerofthe
newfederalcommonlawunderErie,throughcommand.Whiletheillustrationsallhighlightthe
kindofdoctrinalinnovationsthatarelikelytopersuadestatecourtsonlyafterbeing
pronouncedbytheSupremeCourt,thelowerfederalcourtsalsocaninfluencethegeneral
commonlawmakingprocessbycontributingtotheCourt’snewdoctrinalformulations.The
BurlingtonNorthernCourt’sfashioningofitsholdingthroughtheadoptionoflanguagefrom
lowercourtdecisionsprovidesanexample.262
 ThisinteractivegeneralcommonlawmakingprocessalsocanresultintheCourt
refashioningexistinglawinthelightofstatelawdevelopments;theCourt’sroleinthesearch
forthebestlawneednotalwaysbeoneofleadership.TheCourt’sadoption,inMoragnev.
StatesMarineLines,Inc.,263ofacauseofactionforwrongfuldeathunderfederalmaritime

261Statestatutesthatcappunitivedamagesinatleastcertainactionsalsoprovideaspecialsetpolicybalance
betweenthedeterrentpurposesofpunitivedamagesandtheireconomiccosts.See,e.g.,Mo.Ann.Stat.538.210
(limitingrecoveryfornoneconomicdamagesinmedicalmalpracticeactionsto$350,000);Ga.CodeAnn.51Ͳ12Ͳ5.1
(1992)(limitingpunitivedamagesoutsideofproductsliabilityto$250,000unlessclaimantdemonstratesanintent
toharm);Mass.Gen.Lawsch.231,§85K(limitingtortliabilityofcertaincharitableorganizationsto$20,000per
action);Va.CodeAnn.8.01Ͳ38(limitingpunitivedamagesto$350,000).Indeed,thecapsoncompensatoryand
punitivedamagessetbytheCivilRightsActof1991,seenotexxxsupra,strikeaparticularbalanceforpunitive
damagesthatJusticeO’Connor’smodificationoftheRestatementRulewouldseemtoupset.Alternatively,a
strongargumentcanbemadethattheKolstaddecision’slimitationonpunitivedamagesobviatesthecontinuing
needforthecapsonTitleVIIdamages.SeeHarper,supranote,at494Ͳ496.
262SeeTANandnotexxxsupra.Indeed,theLaborBoard’sroleinthedevelopmentofthe“entrepreneurial”testfor
employmentstatus,seeTANandnotesxxxͲxxxsupra,andtheEEOC’sguidelineexcludingcontrollingemployees
fromsuchstatus,seeTANandnotesxxxͲxxxsupra,bothsuggestaroleforthefederalexecutivebranchaswell.
263398U.S.375(1970).
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commonlaw264providesaclearexampleoftheCourtchangingfederallawtoalignwithnew
statelaw.TheCourtinMoragnereliedinpartonthestates’unanimousadoptionofwrongful
deathactionstooverturnitsearlierholdinginTheHarrisburg265rejectinganyactionfor
wrongfuldeathunderfederalmaritimecommonlaw.266Thefactthatthelegaldevelopments
reliedoninMoragnewereprimarilystatutory267doesnotmakeitlessrelevanttothepotential
forstatecommonlawinfluenceonfederaljudiciallawmaking.JusticeHarlan’sfinelycrafted
opinionfortheMoragneCourtexplainedwhystatutorylaw,likecommonlawdevelopmentsin
“England,”268alsocanexpressapolicyconsensus“tobegivenitsappropriateweightnotonlyin
mattersofstatutoryconstructionbutalsointhoseofdecisionallaw.”269
 InMoragnetheCourtexercisedthespecializedfederalcommonlawmakingauthorityit
retainedafterErietoformulategeneralmaritimelawratherthantheauthoritytoconstrue
statutesasintheemploymentlawexamplestreatedinthisessay.Thedistinctionbetween
lawmakingauthorityoutsideofastatutorystructure,likethatforfederalmaritimeoradmiralty
law,andlawmakingauthoritydelegatedthroughgeneralstatutoryprovisions,likethose
interpretedinthisessay’sexamples,however,isnotimportanttothepotentialrelevanceof
statelaw.Astatutoryprovision,likethatin§301oftheLaborManagementRelationsActor
thatofthegeneralprovisionsoftheShermanAct,canprovideasmuchauthoritytomakelaw
asanyconstitutionalprovision.Andevenmoreconfinedstatutoryauthority,likethatexercised
inthisessay’sexamples,mustberesponsivetoconsiderationsofthestatute’spurposesinlight
ofdevelopingpublicpolicy.
 RecognitionoftheappropriatenessoftheCourt’sexerciseofstatutoryͲbasedlawmaking
authorityinresponsetostatelawdevelopmentsdoesnotentailadoptionofJudgeCalabresi’s

264Id.at409.
265119U.S.199(1886).
266398at388Ͳ392.
267Indeed,thestatelawonwhichtheCourtreliedwasexclusivelystatutory.Id.at390(“IntheUnitedStates,every
statetodayhasenactedawrongfulͲdeathstatute.”)
268Id.at388Ͳ89.
269JusticeHarlandrewsupportfromJamesLandis’sclassicarticle,StatutesandtheSourcesofLawinHarvardLegal
Essays213(1934),reprintedat2Harv.J.onLegis.7(1965).JusticeHarlan,398U.S.at392,quotedProfessor
Landis’sconclusionthat“muchofwhatisordinarilyregardedas‘commonlaw’findsitssourceinlegislative
enactment.”2Harv.J.onLegis.at8.Foranotherinsightfulexpositionoftheinteractionbetweenstatutesandthe
commonlaw,seeRogerJ.Traynor,StatutesRevolvinginCommonͲLawOrbits,17Cath.U.L.Rev.401(1967).
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radicalproposaltofreecourtstoreinterpretstatutesfreeofstatutoryconstraintsthatthe
legislaturehasfailedto“update”inresponsetopostͲenactmentdevelopments.270Tovarying
degrees,statutesdoconstrainthelawmakingauthoritydelegatedtothecourtsandexecutive
agencies.Evenwhensuchconstraints,inthefaceoflegislativeinaction,frustratethelaw’s
responsetosocialdevelopments,courtsmustrespecttheconstitutionalprerogativesof
Congress.Suchrespect,however,doesnotrequireignoringthebroadgapͲfillingauthority
typicallydelegatedbyCongress.Thoughthedelegatedauthorityusuallymaynotbeasbroadas
thatconveyedby§301oftheLMRA271orbytheShermanAct,272fewstatutes,including
employmentstatueslikeTitleVII,includelanguagethatcanorisintendedbyCongressto
anticipateandansweralldoctrinalquestions.Ifastatuteisnottobeimplementedbyan
executiveagencythatisdelegatedlawmakingauthoritytofillthestatute’sgaps,those
questionsmustbeansweredbycourtsfreetoconsidertheanswersstatecourtshaveprovided
tocognatequestions.
 Somemightarguethatfederallawmakingintheexerciseofstatutoryauthoritycannot
beasdynamicasJusticeHarlan’srefashioningofmaritimelawinMoragnebecausetheCourt
cannotasreadilyreinterpretastatutoryprovisionasitcanaprincipleoffederalcommonlaw
notderivedfromastatutorysource.273Yet,inBoysMarkets,Inc.v.RetailClerksUnion,Local
770,274theCourtoverruledoneofitsmostimportantearlyinterpretationsof§301(a)ofthe
LMRA275inlightofadifferentunderstandingofwhatcouldadvance“thecongressionalpolicy
favoringthevoluntaryestablishmentofamechanismforthepeacefulresolutionoflabor

270SeeGuidoCalabresi,ACommonLawfortheAgeofStatutes(Harvard1982).JudgeCalabresimostsuccinctly
stateshisproposalasa“hypotheticaldoctrine:”“Letussupposethatcommonlawcourtshavethepowertotreat
statutesinprecicselythesamewaythattheytreatthecommonlaw.Theycan…alterawrittenlaworsomepartof
itinthesameway(andwiththesamereluctance)inwhichtheycanmodifyorabandonacommonlawdoctrineor
evenawholecomplexsetofinterrelateddoctrines.”Id.at82.
27129U.S.C.§185(a).
27215U.S.C.§1etseq.
273See,e.g.,Levi,supranotexx,at523Ͳ24.
274398U.S.235(1970).
275SinclairRefiningCo.v.Atkinson,370U.S.195(1970)(holdingthattheantiͲinjunctionprovisionsoftheNorrisͲ
LaGuardiaActbarfederalcourtinjunctionsofastrikeinbreachofanoͲstrikeclauseinacollectivebargaining
agreement).
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disputes.”276AndtheCourt,withoutanyCongressionalmodificationoftheShermanAct,has
overrulednumerouspriordecisionsinlightofabetterunderstandingofhowtoservebestthe
statute’sgoalsofbenefittingconsumersthroughefficientcompetition.277Theemploymentlaw
doctrinesfashionedinthedecisionsconsideredinthisessayprovideasclearexamplesof
judiciallawmakingasdo§301orShermanActdecisions.Theemploymentlawdecisions,like§
301orShermanActdecisions,madelaw;theydidnotsimplydeterminewhatlawwasmadeby
Congress.Thereisthusnoreasonwhythesedecisionscouldnotbemodifiedinresponsetoa
betterunderstandingofhowstatutorypurposesmightbeservedwithinintendedstatutory
constraints,andnoreasonthatinnovativedecisionsbystatecourtscouldnotcontributetothat
understanding.278
 Themorecommonflowofinfluenceinmodernjudiciallawmaking,nonetheless,islikely
tobefromtheSupremeCourttothestatecourts.TheSupremeCourtbyvirtueofitsplacement
atthetopoftheAmericanjudicialhierarchyismorelikelytoinfluenceevenwhenitcannot
command.Thisessayhasattemptedtoexplainthroughillustrationsdrawnfromrecent
employmentlawdevelopmentshowtheCourtretainsinaneraofstatutorylawmuchofthe
capabilitytoinfluencestatelawthatitclaimedinthegeneralcommonlaweraofSwift.


276398U.S.at253.TheBoysMarketCourtheldthatfederalcourtscanissueinjunctionstoenforcenoͲstrike
clausesincollectivebargainingagreementswheretheenjoinedstrikeisoveragrievancesubjecttoarbitration
undertheagreement.Id.at253Ͳ254.
277See,e.g.,StateOilCo.v.Khan,522U.S.3,7(1997)(overrulingAlbrechtv.HeraldCo.,390U.S.145(1968)to
holdthatverticalmaximumpricefixingisnotaperseviolationof§1ofShermanAct);ContinentalT.V.v.GTE
Sylvania,433U.S.36,58(1977)(overrulingtheperseruleagainstverticalterritorialrestraintsstatedinUnited
Statesv.Arnold,Schwinn&Co.,388U.S.365(1967)).
278Forinstance,statelawdecisionsrefiningthedistinctionbetweenemployeesandindependentcontractorscould
providesupportfortheSupremeCourt’sultimateexplicitacceptanceoftheentrepreneurialcontrolteststatedin
§1.01oftheRestatementofEmploymentLawThird.SeeTANandnotesxxxͲxxxsupra.
